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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S NEGATIVE SPACE: 
BEYOND THE UTILITARIAN 
ELIZABETH L. ROSENBLATT
ABSTRACT
 A growing body of scholarship addresses intellectual property’s “negative spaces”: areas 
in which creation and innovation thrive without significant formal protection from intellec-
tual property law. A number of negative space scholars have used case studies to examine 
the relationship between negative spaces and economic incentives for creation and innova-
tion. But for a full understanding of intellectual property law, and particularly its negative 
spaces, we must go beyond utilitarianism. This means exploring negative spaces not only as 
they relate to incentive and efficiency considerations, but also as they relate to conceptions of 
intellectual property based on labor-desert, personality, and distributive justice theories. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 Imagine that you awake one morning with the following agenda: 
first, you cook breakfast from a recipe that you hand-copied out of a 
                                                                                                                  
 Assistant Professor and Director, Center for Intellectual Property Law, Whittier 
Law School. Thanks to Mark Lemley, Wendy Gordon, Robert Merges, Greg Mandel, Aaron 
Perzanowski, Eric Johnson, Brenda Simon, the participants at the 2011 Intellectual 
Property Scholars’ Conference, and the participants at the Fall 2011 Southern California 
Junior Law Scholars’ Workshop for their insight and input. 
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friend’s cookbook. Then, you work on a law review article that quotes 
liberally from colleagues’ scholarly works. In the afternoon you settle 
down to sew an outfit heavily influenced by a designer runway sam-
ple. Finally, you wear your newly sewn outfit to perform a show of 
stand-up comedy consisting entirely of paraphrased jokes you heard 
other comedians tell.  
 Are your activities wholly original? No. Though they may require 
some creativity on your part, they range from adaptation to out-and-
out copying. Even so, they are not likely to make you an intellectual 
property infringer. Cuisine, fashion, and stand-up comedy are notori-
ously unprotected areas of creation,1 and academic quotation is fair 
use.2 And yet, with a few changed details—copying a company’s reci-
pe for solvent rather than a chef’s recipe for breakfast, copying a 
script to sell rather than a law review article for scholarly commen-
tary; copying a sculpture rather than a dress, or playing a concert of 
cover songs rather than second-hand jokes—you would be much more 
likely to owe royalties or face infringement liability.  
 Intellectual property law stringently protects some areas of crea-
tion and innovation. It does not protect others, either because the law 
excludes them from protection or because creators opt out of protec-
tion or enforcement. Some of these unprotected areas even seem to 
benefit from the lack of protection. These are intellectual property’s 
“negative spaces”—areas where creation and innovation thrive with-
out significant formal intellectual property protection.3
 In recent years, scholars have turned their attention to this phe-
nomenon. Most have conducted case studies, exploring such diverse 
negative spaces as fashion,4 cuisine,5 magic tricks,6 stand-up comedy,7
                                                                                                                  
 1. See generally Christopher J. Buccafusco, On The Legal Consequences of Sauces: 
Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
1121 (2007) (exploring the copyrightability of recipes and concluding that economic, public 
policy and cultural considerations counsel against extending copyright protection to 
recipes); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008) (exploring copyright protection for stand-up comedy and noting 
that social norms provide a substitute for IP law); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, 
The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV.
1687 (2006) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox] (focusing on the lack of 
intellectual property protection for fashion designs).   
 2. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (defining copyright fair use). 
 3. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 1764 (coining and 
defining the term “negative space” in the intellectual property context). 
 4. Id.; Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61
STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, Revisited] (clarifying and 
expanding on the arguments explored in Piracy Paradox and responding to scholarly 
proposals for legislative reform). 
 5. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
29, 44-45 (1994) [hereinafter Litman, Exclusive] (reexamining the bargain between 
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typefaces,8 open source software,9 sports,10 wikis,11 academic science,12
jambands,13 hip hop mixtapes,14 and even roller derby pseudonyms.15
                                                                                                                  
copyright holders and the public that copyright entails and arguing that nascent industry 
can be stimulated by lack of copyright protection); cf. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy 
Paradox, supra note 1, at 1768. See generally J. Austin Broussard, Note, An Intellectual 
Property Food Fight: Why Copyright Law Should Embrace Culinary Innovation, 10 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 691 (2008) (arguing for copyright protection for chefs’ innovative recipes 
as original works of authorship); Buccafusco, supra note 1 (exploring the copyrightability of 
recipes and concluding that economic, public policy, and cultural considerations counsel 
against extending copyright protection to recipes); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von 
Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI.
187 (2008) (arguing that recipes are better protected by self-enforced social norms than by 
intellectual property law).   
 6. See generally Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual 
Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. 
Corcos ed., 2010) (describing the ways in which the magic community has developed social 
norms that protect intellectual property in the absence of IP law). 
 7. See generally Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1 (arguing that intellectual property 
law is not a cost-effective way to protect creativity of stand-up comedians and that social 
norms provide a substitute for IP law). 
 8. See Blake Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copyright Protection, 8 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 425, 432-37 (2010) (arguing for the continued exclusion of 
typefaces from copyright protection and explaining why that exclusion does not prevent 
innovation). See generally Jacqueline D. Lipton, To © or Not to ©? Copyright and 
Innovation in the Digital Typeface Industry, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 143 (2009) (calling for 
Congress, the Copyright Office, and courts to reexamine the issue of typeface 
copyrightability and arguing for at most thin protection for digital typefaces).  
 9. See generally, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of 
the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (analyzing the economic and cultural implications of 
peer production of information). 
 10. See F. Scott Kieff, Robert G. Kramer & Robert M. Kunstadt, It's Your Turn, But 
It's My Move: Intellectual Property Protection for Sports “Moves,” 25 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 765, 766, 774-76 (2009) (arguing that the use of IP rights in 
sports give more bargaining power to a much broader range of athletes); Gerard N. 
Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 875, 877 (2009) (arguing that “there should be a presumption against considering a 
process patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 when a norm can be found in the 
relevant industry against patenting the class of innovations at issue”). 
 11. See generally Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media, and the Curatorial 
Audience, 1 HARVARD J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 95 (2010) (arguing for a wiki model in which 
collaboration is encouraged but normative expectations of authorship are maintained).
 12. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual 
Property and the Public Domain, Part II, 18 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 191, 204 (1994) 
[hereinafter Aoki, Part II] (explaining that academic scientists are driven by “desires to 
obtain priority and to gain professional recognition, promotions, grants, tenure and 
increased funding” to publish their research regardless of intellectual property incentives). 
See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University 
Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005). 
 13. See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can 
Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 
653, 676-77 (2006) (describing the ways in which the jamband community uses social 
norms to enforce copyright law).
 14. See Horace E. Anderson, Jr., “Criminal Minded?”: Mixtape DJs, the Piracy 
Paradox, and Lessons for the Recording Industry, 76 TENN. L. REV. 111, 114, 140-53 (2008) 
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Until now, this examination has proceeded from a utilitarian per-
spective with scant attention to other theoretical frameworks. Com-
mentators have been most concerned with negative spaces as anoma-
lies to incentive theory and have analyzed how creators and innova-
tors in these spaces benefit from efficiencies and incentives other 
than formal intellectual protection.16
 But while the constitutional underpinnings of intellectual proper-
ty law are explicitly incentive-based for copyright and patent law,17
and implicitly so for trademark law,18 utilitarian theory alone can-
not explain all aspects of current intellectual property law.19 For  
                                                                                                                  
(extending Raustiala and Sprigman’s “piracy paradox” from the fashion industry to mixtapes 
and arguing for a model that employs strategic forbearance of copyright enforcement).
 15. See generally David Fagundes, Talk Derby To Me: Intellectual Property Norms 
Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012) (investigating the extra-
legal governance scheme used to protect derby names to explain the emergence of 
subcultural IP norms). For a taxonomy of negative spaces and examined factors conducive 
to their creation and maintenance, see Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative 
Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317 (2011). 
 16. See generally Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 
(2010) (collecting and analyzing case studies of “constructed cultural commons” such as 
patent pools, open-source software, Wikipedia, the Associated Press, and jamband 
communities using a utilitarian framework); Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra 
note 1 (describing negative spaces as defying incentive theory and posing utilitarian 
explanation for fashion’s success as a negative space); Rosenblatt, supra note 15 
(discussing factors that contribute to creation and maintenance of negative spaces from  
utilitarian standpoint). 
 17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall . . . promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (describing the objective of the patent monopoly as existing so 
that “[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through 
the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy” (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974))); United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The sole interest of the United States and the 
primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by 
the public from the labors of authors. It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to 
induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 
HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 108 n.5 (1997) (noting that Thomas Jefferson explicitly disavowed any 
natural-law underpinning of intellectual property rights); John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair 
Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 473-75 (2005) 
[hereinafter Tehranian, Et Tu] (discussing U.S. courts’ early rejections of non-utilitarian 
theories of intellectual property).
 18. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879) (describing utilitarian 
incentive justification for trademark law). 
 19. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 150-53 (2011) 
(arguing that “efficiency is not capable of serving as a stand-alone foundation for IP 
rights”). Some have identified disjunctions between the utilitarian justification for 
intellectual property law and the actual creative process. See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, 
Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012) (“New 
strains of thinking in the fields of economics, psychology, and business-management 
studies now debunk the long-venerated idea that legal authority must provide some 
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example, the term extensions of the Sonny Bono Copyright Act are 
retroactive, although retroactivity could not incentivize past or future 
creation.20 Patent law protects software well past the point of obso-
lescence,21 and trademark law protects marks regardless of the quali-
ty of the underlying products.22 Various doctrines permit gratis uses  
of works and inventions as beneficial to society despite the risk of  
decreased production.23
 Empirical research shows that despite the Constitution’s utilitari-
an justification for intellectual property protection, the American 
public is largely unconcerned with the incentive function of IP law.24
People see intellectual property infringement as “unfair,” not on in-
centive grounds, but based on natural law and distributive justice 
concepts that the creator is “entitled” to damages and that copying is 
immoral or theft-like.25 This finding is radically different from the 
traditional justification for intellectual property protection and is 
                                                                                                                  
artificial inducement to artistic and technological progress.”) Rebecca Tushnet, Economies 
of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2009) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, Economies of Desire] (“Psychological and sociological concepts can do 
more to explain creative impulses than classical economics. As a result, a copyright law 
that treats creativity as a product of economic incentives can miss the mark and harm 
what it aims to promote.”). But see William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 169, 180-81 (Stephen R. 
Munzer ed., 2001) (noting that “empirical work has failed to answer the ultimate question 
of whether the stimulus to innovation is worth its costs”); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology 
of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (2010) (discussing psychology of creation 
in utilitarian terms). 
 20. Tehranian, Et Tu, supra note 17, at 488-92 (describing areas of copyright law that 
are more consistent with natural-law justifications than utilitarian incentive theory); John 
Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics) of 
IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2011) [hereinafter Tehranian, 
Parchment] (discussing how the extension of copyright term signals a non-utilitarian justi-
fication for protection). 
 21. See Mark E. Stallion, A Practical Overview of U.S. Patent Law Challenges and 
Strategy, in DEVELOPING A PATENT STRATEGY: LEADING LAWYERS ON COUNSELING CLIENTS 
ON PATENT PROTECTION, EVALUATING PATENT PORTFOLIOS, AND WORKING WITH THE 
USPTO 219, 228 (2010) (noting that new software technology can become obsolete even 
before a first office action by the patent office, to say nothing of the time required for a 
patent to issue).
 22. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, § 3:10 (“[T]he quality function of marks does not mean that marks always 
signify ‘high’ quality goods or services—merely that the quality level, whatever it is, will 
remain consistent and predictable among all goods or services supplied under the mark.”).   
 23. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (defining copyright fair use); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) 
(2012) (denying remedies for infringement of patents on medical activities). 
 24. See Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Psychology of Intellectual Property, 23 (Nov. 
13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Overall, respondents were 
substantially more likely to identify a natural rights entitlement basis for intellectual 
property rights (60%) than either an incentive (23%) or expressive (17%) basis. These 
results run strongly contrary to the dominant theories of intellectual property law 
recognized in most intellectual property policy, economic, and legal analysis.”). 
 25. Id.; see also Moore, supra note 17, at 81-82.  
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crucial to understanding intellectual property’s negative spaces—if 
people’s relationships with intellectual property law aren’t driven 
by utilitarian concerns, then we must look past those concerns  
to understand why people elect to create in intellectual property’s  
negative spaces.  
 To the extent that current law embodies theories beyond utilitari-
anism, our understanding of negative spaces—and hence our ability 
to apply the lessons of negative space to our formal protection 
scheme—is thus incomplete without examining how negative spaces 
fit into these other rubrics. Despite the wealth of analysis both illu-
minating and applying labor-desert, personality, and distributive jus-
tice theories to intellectual property law, it has yet to apply them spe-
cifically to negative spaces. This article undertakes that examination. 
 Courts and scholars have, generally speaking, advanced three 
non-utilitarian justifications for intellectual property law:26 (1) labor-
desert theory, which originates loosely from John Locke’s Two Trea-
tises and posits that creators deserve to own the fruits of their intel-
lectual labor;27 (2) personality theory, which extends from Hegel by 
way of Margaret Jane Radin and suggests that creators have a moral 
claim on their creations as an expression of their personalities;28 and 
(3) distributive justice, the idea that formal intellectual property 
rules should advance a “just and attractive culture.”29
 Why should we care? Theorizing the world as it already exists 
may seem like navel-gazing—retroactively categorizing what may be 
fortuitous or coincidental—and intellectual property theorizing is no 
exception. But it has considerable normative value; by pinpointing 
the theoretical justifications for formal intellectual property protec-
tion, we can understand the extent to which our laws achieve and fail 
to achieve their theoretical aims and how the law should evolve to 
reflect those goals.30 There is an equally high value in understanding 
when and why our traditional justifications for intellectual property 
protection do not apply—or apply in surprising ways. Every theory of 
                                                                                                                  
 26. Many scholars have expounded upon this framework; William Fisher, Justin 
Hughes, and Robert Merges have provided particularly enlightening analyses. See 
generally MERGES, supra note 19 (categorizing IP theories differently, but offering similar 
underlying theoretical bases for IP law); Fisher, supra note 19 (outlining various theories 
underlying intellectual property law); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (exploring labor-desert and personhood theories of 
intellectual property law). 
 27. See generally Moore, supra note 17 (arguing that current intellectual property law 
is more Lockean than utilitarian). 
 28. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1982). 
 29. Fisher, supra note 19, at 194. See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, 
Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (2005). 
 30. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 194-99 (on the value of theoretical discussion). 
2013]             INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S NEGATIVE SPACE 447
intellectual property supports protection of one sort or another. Yet 
in negative spaces, protection is either unnecessary or undesired. 
Does this overturn our understanding of intellectual property as we  
know it? 
 No. Negative spaces do not undermine the justifications for formal 
intellectual property protection, but they do shed light on when such 
protection is—or is not—called for. The utilitarian approach illumi-
nates when protection is not necessary as an incentive to production. 
The same is true for the other theories; by exploring negative spaces 
through the lens of labor-desert, personality, and distributive justice 
theories, we can gain new insight into when protection may not con-
stitute an ideal reward for labor (per labor-desert theory), when pro-
tection may not be necessary to vindicate personhood concerns (per 
personality theory), and when protection may be at odds with the 
creation of a just and attractive society. 
 This article begins with background, first regarding negative 
spaces, and then regarding theories of intellectual property law. Then 
it explores how these theories apply to negative spaces, and suggests 
several normative conclusions that follow from this exploration. 
II. IP’S NEGATIVE SPACES
 The term “negative space” originates in art, where it refers to the 
area surrounding a figure that makes the figure stand out.31 In the 
intellectual property lexicon, the term refers to areas of creation and 
innovation that thrive with little or no intellectual property protec-
tion. To be clear, many areas of creation function in the absence of 
intellectual property protection, but not every such area constitutes 
negative space. Much as the negative space of a painting includes 
only the unfigured portions of the canvas rather than the air sur-
rounding the canvas, the negative space of intellectual property law 
does not reach so far as to include everything that is not protected by 
intellectual property law. It includes only those areas of creation  
and innovation that actually benefit—or at least do not seem to  
suffer—from the lack of intellectual property protection.32
                                                                                                                  
31. See David Leggett, Enhancing Your Art With Negative Space, TUTORIAL 9 (Oct. 21, 
2008), http://www.tutorial9.net/resources/enhancing-your-art-with-negative-space/. 
 32. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 1764 (defining the 
term as encompassing any “substantial area of creativity” in which intellectual property 
laws do not penetrate or provide “only very limited propertization”); Rosenblatt, supra note 
15, at 322 (defining “negative space” in intellectual property context). Of course, since our 
laws are not a controlled experiment, it is impossible to say with certainty whether an 
unprotected area of creation or innovation definitely benefits or does not suffer from a lack 
of protection. The most we can know is whether an area thrives in that absence; from that, 
we can assess whether it belongs in the category of negative space.   
448 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:441 
 It is appropriate that negative-space scholarship flourish now. 
Consider the growing economic and social significance of negative 
spaces: software companies are releasing major products in open 
source form, and creative commons licensing is commonplace.33 Musi-
cians are experimenting with negative-space models in the tradition-
ally strong IP world of record distribution, hoping that voluntary 
payment schemes will bring new listeners and sales of backing tracks 
will bring new buyers interested in remixing.34 Viral video makers, 
bloggers, and the twitterverse have embraced the idea that copying 
can be good for business.  
 At the same time, negative spaces are under fire, as litigation, leg-
islation, and community customs push against the boundaries of pre-
viously stable regions of the public domain. Efforts to create indus-
try-specific fashion design protection legislation have persisted for 
years and may succeed.35 Debate continues over the benefits and 
drawbacks of adopting European-style database protection.36 Contro-
versy rages over the patentability of gene sequences and basic re-
search.37 The “hot news” misappropriation doctrine has gained atten-
                                                                                                                  
 33. See, e.g., Metrics, CC WIKI, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Metrics (last modified 
August 27, 2012) (mapping growth in use of creative commons licenses). 
 34. Examples abound, including Radiohead, Jonathan Coulton, and Nine Inch Nails. See
Alex Blumberg, An Internet Rock Star Tells All, NPR: PLANET MONEY (May 13, 2011, 1:59 
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/05/14/136279162/an-internet-rock-star-tells-all 
(describing Coulton’s financial success using this model); Case Studies: Nine Inch Nails The 
Slip, CC WIKI, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Case_Studies/Nine_Inch_Nails_The_Slip (last 
modified July 12, 2012) (describing the band Nine Inch Nails’ model of distributing songs 
and multi-track source files for free and inviting remix use); Eric Garland, The ‘In 
Rainbows’ Experiment: Did It Work?, NPR: MONITOR MIX (Nov. 16, 2009, 10:00  
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/monitormix/2009/11/the_in_rainbows_experiment_did.html 
(“Releasing a pay-what-you-wish album now is almost yawn-worthy. Major artists are 
experimenting with price points, novel distribution models and giveaways at a dizzying 
pace.”); Songs, JONATHAN COULTON, http://www.jonathancoulton.com/songs/ (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013) (Coulton’s release of songs without digital rights management, on a partially 
pay what you want model, under creative commons license, inviting users to remix and/or 
purchase wordless karaoke tracks); Josh Tyrangiel, Radiohead Says: Pay What You  
Want, TIME (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1666973,00.html 
(discussing Radiohead’s “pay what you want” pricing). 
 35. See Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(proposing amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. to add 3-year protection for fashion 
designs); see also Anandashankar Mazumdar, Witnesses Praise Latest Version of Fashion 
Design Protection Legislation, Urge Passage, BLOOMBERG BNA: PATENT, TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (July 19, 2011) (discussing industry and academic testimony 
regarding previous iteration of the bill).
 36. See Miriam Bitton, Protection for Informational Works After Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 
612-14 (2011) (framing the continuing debate). 
 37. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that composition claims covering isolated DNA 
sequences were directed to patent-eligible subject matter), cert. granted in part, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-
398) (granting certiorari on the question of whether human genes constitute patentable 
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tion as consumers have turned to internet news aggregators for up-
to-the-minute information—and whether Google News and The Huff-
ington Post are hot news infringers depends upon who you ask.38
Though tattoo artists have traditionally shunned copyright and 
trademark protection in favor of community policing,39 one sued the 
makers of the film Hangover 2 for giving a character a face tattoo like 
Mike Tyson’s.40 Bikram Choudhury, the entrepreneur responsible for 
popularizing “hot yoga,” has sued other “hot yoga” purveyors for cop-
yright infringement—challenging not only traditional notions about 
the boundaries of intellectual property protection for athletics but 
also the conventional wisdom that athletic communities would rather 
compete in the ring or on the field than fight each other in court.41
Similarly, although scholars have hailed performance magic as one of 
intellectual property’s negative spaces,42 stage magician Teller has 
sued a Dutch entertainer over a YouTube video that imitates Teller’s 
famous trick “Shadows.”43 Litigation has challenged the common un-
derstanding that fair use protects copying for scholarly and classroom 
                                                                                                                  
subject matter); ARIAD Pharms. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that written description requirement of 38 U.S.C. § 112 barred patenting of  
basic research). 
 38. See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 650 F.3d 876  
(2d Cir. 2011) (holding that “hot news” claim was preempted by copyright law; 
permitting the republishing of securities recommendations issued by leading  
financial institutions); Jonathan Stempel, Dow Jones, Briefing.com Settle “Hot News” 
Lawsuit, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/16/ 
us-briefingcom-dowjones-hotnews-settleme-idUSTRE6AF37G20101116 (describing settlement 
between Dow Jones and Briefing.com in which Briefing.com admitted to “hot news” liability 
for republishing financial news and headlines). See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot 
News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011) (discussing 
the relatively recent resurgence of the “hot news” misappropriation doctrine). 
 39. See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Intellectual Property Norms in the Tattoo 
Industry (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145048. 
 40. Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., No. 4:11-cv-00752-CDP (E.D. Mo. filed April 
28, 2011); see Noam Cohen, Tattoo Artist Settles Tyson Dispute With ‘Hangover 2’, N.Y.
TIMES.COM (June 21, 2011, 2:18 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/ 
tattoo-artist-settles-tyson-dispute-with-hangover-2/ (describing dispute and settlement). 
 41. Bikrams Yoga Coll. of India LP v. Yoga To The People Inc, No. 2:11-cv-07998-
DMG-FMO (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012); see also Ben McGrath, Steamed, THE NEW YORKER
(Feb. 6, 2012), www.newyorker.com/takl/2012/02/06/120206ta_talk_mcgrath (discussing 
Choudhury suit); David Wright, Ben Newman & Lauren Effron, Bikram Yoga Guru Reaches 
Settlement in Copyright Suit, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ 
bikram-yoga-guru-reaches-settlement-copyright-suit/story?id=17869598#.UL_R39fNDfJ. 
 42. See generally Loshin, supra note 6 (describing IP without IP norms in 
performance magic). 
 43. Teller v. Dogge, No. 2:12-cv-00591-JCM-GWF (D. Nev. filed April 15, 2012);  
see Eriq Gardner, Teller of Penn & Teller Breaks Silence to Sue Over Magic Trick,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 15, 2012, 11:41 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/ 
thr-esq/penn-teller-lawsuit-reveal-secrets-youtube-312296 (discussing Teller suit).  
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use.44 Publisher John Wiley & Sons sued U.S. patent attorneys for 
submitting copies of journal articles to the U.S. Patent Office during 
the patent prosecution process, notwithstanding a 2012 patent office 
memo stating that such copying should be considered a non-
actionable fair use.45 Some of these stories no doubt represent outli-
ers in the broader arena of negative space. But taken together, they 
tend to demonstrate a trend toward greater protection in areas where 
law or custom had previously barred or shunned it.  
 Negative spaces are not only growing but are also at the center of 
intellectual property debates and crackdowns. What makes them so 
appealing and so volatile, and what can they tell us about formal in-
tellectual property protection? To answer these questions, we must 
understand what makes negative spaces tick.  
 Negative spaces may vary greatly from each other. In some—fashion, 
hairstyles, sports—copying is rampant and expected.46 In others, cus-
tom and community standards enforce a sort of “IP without IP” that 
may even result in a greater level of protection than formal intellec-
tual property law would provide. Stand-up comedians rely on com-
munity norms, for example, to protect not only expressions, but also 
ideas.47 In still others—creative commons and the open-source 
movement, for example—creators invite copying and imitation, but 
do so in the shadow of law.48 But despite their differences, all nega-
tive spaces share a “low-IP equilibrium,” where intellectual property 
protection is absent, or largely so, but creation thrives.49 The absence 
                                                                                                                  
 44. See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012) 
(holding that some, but not all, of professors’ uses of excerpts and/or chapters of 
copyrighted works in classroom “course packs” constituted fair use under Copyright Act). 
 45. See John Wiley & Sons v. McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff, LLP, No. 1:12-
01446 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 29, 2012); Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, 
P.A., No. 0:12-cv-00528-RHK-JJK (D. Minn. July 2, 2012); Memorandum from Bernard J. 
Knight, Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Position on Fair Use of 
Copies of NPL Made in Patent Examination (January 19, 2012), available at www.uspto.gov/ 
about/offices/ogc/USPTOPositiononFairUse_of_CopiesofNPLMadeinPatentExamination.pdf. 
The USPTO has intervened in the Minnesota case and filed a counterclaim for declaratory 
judgment seeking a ruling that patent prosecutors do not infringe by copying journal 
articles while researching prior art for patent applications. See also Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Couterclaim, Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, 
P.A. No. 0:12-cv-00528-RHK-JJK (D. Minn Nov. 13, 2012).  
 46. See Magliocca, supra note 10, at 876-77 (discussing sportsmanship norms); Raustiala 
& Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 1722, 1772 (copying in fashion and hairstyles). 
 47. See generally Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1 (describing “IP without IP” in  
stand-up comedy). 
 48. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual 
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1449 
(2010) (discussing how various sharing regimes depend upon the existence of formal 
intellectual property protection). 
 49. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 1764 (discussing low-IP 
equilibrium in negative spaces). 
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of intellectual property protection may be the result of legal exclusion 
or may be the creator’s choice.  
 One may draw a metaphorical map of IP’s negative spaces based 
on the ways in which areas of creation and innovation are most like-
ly to end up outside the boundaries of traditional intellectual  
property protection.50 This approach reveals three categories of  
non-protection: (1) doctrinal no-man’s land; (2) areas in which the 
creators themselves decline formal intellectual property protection; 
and (3) use-based carve-outs.51
Doctrinal no-man’s land represents what is most commonly un-
derstood to be the “public domain.”52 The law permits copying of crea-
tions residing in doctrinal no-man’s land because they fall completely 
or substantially outside the boundaries of intellectual property pro-
tection schemes. When unprotectable elements form the basis for en-
tire endeavors, negative spaces may arise. In the field of fashion de-
sign, one of the best analyzed areas of doctrinal no-man’s land, most 
designs are not protected by copyright law (because they are func-
tional), trademark law (because they have not acquired secondary 
meaning), or design patent law (because they are unregistered).53
Other areas of doctrinal no-man’s land include electronic databases, 
cuisine, perfume, and typeface design.54
IP forbearance occurs when putative intellectual property holders 
forego IP exclusivity by declining to seek protection, declining to pur-
sue infringers, or engaging in widespread royalty-free licensing. Alt-
hough a single creator may forbear, that solitary act of forbearance 
does not create a negative space. For any particular creator, forbear-
ance may be idiosyncratic.55 But when an entire community of crea-
tors forbears, it signals that something systemic in that community 
makes a lack of protection preferable to protection. IP forbearance 
may exist on an industry-wide basis (as in the worlds of stand-up 
comedy, magic, and roller derby pseudonyms) or may occupy partial 
                                                                                                                  
 50. Rosenblatt, supra note 15, at 323-25. 
 51. Id.
 52. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 995 (1990) 
[hereinafter Litman, Public Domain] (explaining the term public domain and noting that it 
has fallen out of favor).  
 53. Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 1698-1705 (discussing 
lack of intellectual property protection for fashion designs).  
 54. See, e.g., Buccafusco, supra note 1, at 1124-27 (discussing cuisine); Fry, supra note 
8, at 430-36 (discussing typefaces); Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 
1770, 1772-73 (discussing electronic databases and perfume). 
 55. See Van Houweling, supra note 29, at 1537 (“Some creators want the monetary 
incentive that [intellectual property law] provides; others do not. Some creators can bear 
the expenses that [intellectual property law] imposes; others cannot.”).
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industries (as in popular music, open source software, and the  
copyleft movement).56
Use-based carve-outs are areas in which the judiciary and Con-
gress create negative space by exempting uses from infringement lia-
bility. These include copyright fair use; trademark fair use and nom-
inative fair use; the narrow “experimental use” exceptions to patent 
infringement; and the statutory exemption for practice of patented 
medical or surgical techniques.57 These carve-outs differ from doctri-
nal no-man’s land because they relate to types of use, rather than 
types of works. Like forbearance and doctrinal no-man’s land, the 
existence of a use-based carve out does not automatically lead to the 
creation of a negative space. Rather, such carve-outs create negative 
space only when they influence entire types of work. For example, 
copyright fair use is not itself a negative space, since it may have 
very different impacts on different types of works. It is possible to 
make fair use of clips from a major motion picture release, but that 
does not make “major motion pictures” a negative space. But copy-
right fair use does create negative spaces, such as academic writing. 
Most uses of academic writing (commentary, quotation, classroom 
copying, library copying) qualify as fair use; scholars continue their 
work despite the likelihood that others can copy their work. Indeed, 
they likely want their work to proliferate through unauthorized, but 
attributed, copying. Along the same lines, creators of medical tech-
niques proceed undaunted although they cannot hold others liable for 
infringement of their patents, and it’s unlikely that accountants and 
tax lawyers will cease developing new tax avoidance strategies mere-
ly because such strategies are no longer patentable.58
                                                                                                                  
 56. See generally Anderson, supra note 14 (discussing hip hop mixtapes); Fagundes, 
supra note 15 (discussing roller-derby pseudonyms); Eric E. Johnson, Rethinking Sharing 
Licenses for the Entertainment Media, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2008)
(discussing copyleft and automatic licenses); Loshin, supra note 6, at 18-24 (discussing 
magic); Jim Markwith, The Coexistence of Open Source and Proprietary Software, 954 
PLI/PAT 227 (2008) (discussing relationship between open and closed source business 
models); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, (discussing stand-up comedy); Schultz, supra 
note 13 (discussing jambands). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012) (defining classic “descriptive” trademark fair use); 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (defining copyright fair use); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012) (defining 
experimental use exception); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) (providing an exemption for practice 
of patented medical or surgical techniques); see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. 
Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (1992) (defining nominative fair use of a trademark). 
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) (providing an exemption for practice of patented medical 
or surgical techniques); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) (“For purposes of evaluating an invention under section 102 or 103 of title 
35, United States Code, any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, 
whether known or unknown at the time of the invention or application for patent, shall be 
deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from the prior art.”). 
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III.   THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
 The Constitution provides a utilitarian rationale for the existence 
of copyright and patent law—to advance the progress of science and 
the useful arts59—and the commerce clause justifies trademark law 
as consumer protection and quality incentives.60 But as discussed 
above, intellectual property protection serves not only economic 
goals, but also moral and social ones. This Article will address the 
four most prominent theories justifying intellectual property protec-
tion—utilitarian, labor-desert, personality, and distributive—and, in 
turn, how each of these theories applies to intellectual property’s  
negative spaces. 
A.   Utilitarian 
 The utilitarian approach holds that intellectual property law 
should maximize social welfare from an economic perspective.61 It 
provides the Constitution’s reasoning that intellectual property pro-
tection promotes the advancement of science and the useful arts62:
Exclusivity enables creators to charge for their creations, which in 
turn provides material incentive to create.  
 An underlying premise of the utilitarian approach is that copying 
costs less than initial creation. Without laws preventing copying, 
consumers would copy works and inventions rather than purchasing 
them, which would deny creators the resources they need to engage 
in further creation.63 Intellectual property exclusivity also provides 
an incentive to create public goods by spreading the cost of produc-
tion among multiple potential purchasers. Thus, creators will make 
                                                                                                                  
 59. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall . . . promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”). 
 60. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879) (describing utilitarian 
incentive justification for trademark law). 
 61. Although it aims to maximize social welfare based on Bentham’s “felicific 
calculus,” the hallmark of the utilitarian approach is wealth maximization. See, e.g.,
F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1,  
44-46 (2004).  
 62. Id.; Hughes, supra note 26, at 303-04 (“The instrumental argument clearly has 
dominated official pronouncements on American copyrights and patents. Even the 
Constitution’s copyright and patent clause is cast in instrumental terms . . . . In almost all 
of its decisions on patents, the Supreme Court has opined that property rights are needed 
to motivate idea-makers.”); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information 
Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 32 (1996) (“Economists tell us . . . that, at the margin, there is 
always an author who will be persuaded by a slight additional incentive to create another 
work, or who will be deterred from creating a particular work by a diminution in the 
copyright bundle of rights.”). 
 63. Fisher, supra note 19, at 169 (identifying as a utilitarian concern that creators 
“will be unable to recoup their ‘costs of expression’ . . . because they will be undercut by 
copyists who bear only the low ‘costs of production’ ”).  
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things even if the creators’ cost of doing so would be greater than the 
individual benefit to the creator of doing so.64 A pharmaceutical com-
pany will expend the massive resources needed to develop a drug, not 
because the company is ill and needs the drug, but because it believes 
people will purchase the drug when it is developed. Similarly, an  
author may expend resources and forego other income to write a 
great work of fiction not only because writing the book is personally 
rewarding, but also in the hope that future readers will want to  
purchase the book. 
 Although the utilitarian approach relies on exclusivity as a pro-
duction incentive, it neither inherently favors nor opposes strong in-
tellectual property protection. Rather, it recognizes that protection 
renders works more expensive to consumers and, as a result, can chill 
further creation and innovation. Thus, utilitarian theory advocates for 
a balance between the potential incentive benefit of exclusivity and the 
potential drawback of curtailed enjoyment or use of works.65
B.   Labor-Desert 
 Labor-desert theory is a natural-law approach most often associ-
ated with Locke’s Two Treatises.66 It proceeds from the premise that 
all the world is initially owned in common.67 One may remove proper-
ty from the commons by improving it through labor, and one who la-
bors has a natural property right to the fruits of those labors, which 
the state must respect and enforce.68 When someone mingles labor 
                                                                                                                  
 64. Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in 
Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 854 (1993) (discussing theoretical 
underpinnings of incentive theory). 
 65. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 169-70 (summarizing incentive theory). 
 66. See Hughes, supra note 26, at 296 (“Reference to Locke’s Two Treatises of 
Government is almost obligatory in essays on the constitutional aspects of property.”); Tom 
G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property 
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 821-35 (1990) (discussing other 
philosophers who supported a labor-desert conception of intellectual property); see also 
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1542-43, 1549-50 (1993) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Property Right] (discussing Lockean theory).  
 67. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285-86 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see also MERGES, supra note 19, at 34-35 (elaborating 
on Locke’s theory of a commons); Hughes, supra note 26, at 297 (“Locke begins the 
discussion by describing a state of nature in which goods are held in common through a 
grant from God.”); Moore, supra note 17, at 81 (describing a commons-based interpretation 
of Lockean labor-desert theory); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private 
Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY
138, 143-54 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (describing a commons-based interpretation of 
Lockean labor-desert theory). 
 68. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (promoting 
the “fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor” in addition to the incentive justification for 
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with the raw materials of the commons, the laborer deserves to own 
(that is, control and benefit from) the resulting product.69 This is en-
tirely distinct from a utilitarian wealth-maximization theory; rather, 
it embodies the notion that “authors and inventors deserve a reward 
for their labor and should be given it regardless of whether they 
would continue their work in the absence of such compensation.”70
Although Locke developed his theory with reference to physical prop-
erty, it extends seamlessly to intellectual property: Creators and  
innovators pluck ideas from a common pool and exert their creative 
labor upon them to make works, inventions, and marks—and when 
they do, they deserve to own them as intellectual property.71
 The adage that “none should reap where another has sown” is 
part, but not the whole, of the labor-desert picture. This is because 
Locke’s theory recognizes the value of a rich commons and thus in-
cludes two crucial provisos: first, the products of labor must remain 
available to the commons if removing them would not leave “enough 
and as good” in common for others; and second, property should not 
be wasted.72 Some scholars interpret the provisos to mean that prop-
erty should be owned exclusively only if such ownership would not 
result in harm.73 Thus, labor-desert theory is not the strong IP  
imperative it might initially appear to be.74 Intellectual property 
                                                                                                                  
copyright); Fisher, supra note 19, at 170-71 (summarizing labor-desert theory); Hughes, 
supra note 26, at 297-98 (summarizing labor-desert theory). 
 69. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1204 (1967) (articulating 
labor-desert theory as an ethical foundation of property ownership). 
 70. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659, 1688-89 (1988). But see Hughes, supra note 26, at 298-99 (noting the existence 
of both instrumentalist and normative branches of Lockean theory). 
 71. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 32-33 (proposing that “Locke’s theory applies 
equally well, if not better, to intellectual property”); Hughes, supra note 26, at 315 (noting 
that differences between ideas and physical goods “suggest that ideas fit Locke’s notion of a 
‘common’ better than does physical property”). See generally Lawrence C. Becker, 
Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609 (1993) (discussing how 
individuals may deserve to own intellectual property more than they deserve to own the 
products of their physical labor). 
 72. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 170 (summarizing labor-desert theory); Hughes, 
supra note 26, at 297-98 (summarizing labor-desert theory); Shiffrin, supra note 67, at 
146-47 (discussing “enough and as good” and waste conditions of the Lockean proviso).  
 73. See, e.g., Gordon, Property Right, supra note 66, at 1540-43. 
 74. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights 
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 474 (1998) [hereinafter, Cohen, Lochner] (discussing 
possible interpretations of Lockean philosophy). See generally Shiffrin, supra note 67. 
Shiffrin’s approach to Lockean theory is different from many, but it is informed directly by 
Locke’s text. Whereas the more common conception of labor-desert theory would state that 
one has a natural right to convert property to one’s own through labor so long as the 
proviso is met, Shiffrin’s interpretation states that one has a natural right to subsistence, 
and that only when exclusive use of a resource is necessary (as it is with, for example, food) 
or when the resource would otherwise be wasted, may that resource be converted to 
ownership through labor. Id. at 146-50. While the roots of Shiffrin’s interpretation are 
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protection makes intellectual resources more expensive and creates 
an anti-commons. Once an idea is improved and removed from the 
commons, it is difficult to say that “as much and as good” is available 
to others because ideas and improvements, unlike most commons re-
sources, are not fungible—one idea is not necessarily as good as every 
other idea, and one improvement is not necessarily as useful as every 
other improvement.75 Thus, much like utilitarian theory, labor-desert 
theory must mediate between the ownership rights of the creator and 
the rights of others to use information that would otherwise be avail-
able to the commons. 
C.   Personality  
 Personality theory originates with Hegel,76 but has been refined 
and popularized by Margaret Jane Radin.77 Personality theory advo-
cates that society should permit creators to own (i.e., control and 
benefit from) their creations because creation—the process of impos-
ing one’s stamp on the world—is important to human flourishing.78
One has a fundamental right to oneself, and one’s products are a 
manifestation of that self. Thus, ownership of one’s creations satisfies 
one’s fundamental needs.79 A creator must control her creations be-
cause the holder of property “could not be the particular person she is 
without it,”80 and the creation and control of intellectual property is 
valuable “for self-actualization, for personal expression, and for dig-
nity and recognition as an individual person.”81
 Unlike labor-desert theory, which began solely as a philosophy of 
tangible property, personality theory has always incorporated a phi-
losophy regarding intellectual creations. Hegel envisioned intellectu-
al property as embodying personality and works of authorship,  
inventions, and trademarks as identifying oneself. Although Hegel 
did not advocate for exclusive rights to personal property, both he 
and others relied on his theory to justify exclusivity over intellectual 
                                                                                                                  
considerably more communitarian than some, the outcome is similar in the intellectual 
property context, as ideas would presumably be wasted in the commons if not used by 
creators or innovators, and thus common ideas are susceptible to ownership through labor. 
 75. Shiffrin, supra note 67, at 156 (discussing differences between ideas and  
tangible property). 
 76. See generally G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 1965) (1821). 
 77. See generally Radin, supra note 28. See also Palmer, supra note 66, at 835-49 
(discussing other philosophers who focused on a personality theory of intellectual property).  
 78. See Hughes, supra note 26, at 330-34 (summarizing personality theory in 
Hegelian terms). 
 79. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 171 (summarizing personality theory of intellectual 
property law); Michelman, supra note 69, at 1205 (articulating personality theory as an 
ethical foundation of property ownership). 
 80. Radin, supra note 28, at 972. 
 81. Hughes, supra note 26, at 330. 
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creations, since fundamental needs or interests such as self-
realization, security, leisure, and identity would be more tied to one’s 
intellectual creations than to more fungible assets.82 For this reason, 
the more “self” is associated with a creation—that is, the more origi-
nal it is—the more it deserves protection.83
 Personality theory is more concerned with recognition than with 
payment or livelihood. From a personality perspective, payment mat-
ters only indirectly, as recognition and acknowledgement that a par-
ticular work reflects the creator’s personhood.84 Attribution vindi-
cates personality rights in a way that royalties alone do not. In real 
property terms, if I can justify a trespass on your property with an 
automatic payment, I have only partially acknowledged your owner-
ship of the property. Although the payment requires me to recognize 
that the property is not my own, it does not require me to recognize 
that the property is specifically yours, nor does it respect your  
right to exclude me. Thus, the “moral rights” of attribution and  
integrity—specifically, the right to be publicly identified as the crea-
tor and the right to protect the work against changes—are touch-
stones of personality theory.85
D.   Distributive Justice 
 “Distributive justice” loosely characterizes a theoretical approach 
concerned with basic fairness, or “advancing a vision of a just and 
attractive culture.”86 On its face, it appears very similar to its utili-
tarian counterpart, as both are instrumentalist; but unlike the strict-
er utilitarian approach, distributive justice considers social and 
                                                                                                                  
 82. Fisher, supra note 19, at 186 (explaining that, as a matter of personality theory, 
exclusivity of control is called for when it would promote peace of mind, privacy, self-
reliance, community, self-realization, security, leisure, responsibility, identity, citizenship, 
or benevolence); see Hughes, supra note 26, at 334, 348 (explaining that Hegel was 
comfortable with alienation of tangible creations, but had great distaste for alienability of  
intellectual property). 
 83. Radin, supra note 28, at 986-87 (describing a continuum on which people  
should have more property protection for non-fungible goods more closely associated with  
their identities).  
 84. See Hughes, supra note 26, at 349 (“From the Hegelian perspective, payments 
from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition. These 
payments acknowledge the individual’s claim over the property, and it is through such 
acknowledgement that an individual is recognized by others as a person.”).  
 85. Id. at 350 (identifying attribution and integrity as “essential” to the justification of 
alienation in personality theory). 
 86. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 102-36 (taking a Rawlsian philosophical approach 
to distributive justice and IP); Fisher, supra note 19, at 175 (summarizing “social planning” 
approach to IP theory as drawn from the political philosophy of several notable theorists, 
including Jefferson, Marx, and the legal realists). 
458 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:441 
communal goals beyond wealth maximization and considers the in-
terests of intellectual property users in addition to creators.87
 Distributive justice theories posit that the government has a duty 
to foster people’s fundamental independence and ability to shape 
their own social and economic environments.88 In his essay Theories 
of Intellectual Property, William Fisher identifies a series of social 
policies, most of which might fairly be described as distributive con-
cerns, that could animate intellectual property policy: consumer wel-
fare (i.e., happiness); creation of a cornucopia of ideas (including crea-
tive incentive and access to ideas); creation of a rich artistic tradition; 
distributive justice; semiotic democracy (i.e., the creation of meaning 
by everyone); sociability (community); and respect.89 These interests 
may frequently be at odds with each other and, in some cases, them-
selves, but to achieve an intellectual property system that promotes 
distributive justice, they all must be considered and balanced.90
 Distributive justice theory demands neither looser nor tighter in-
tellectual property laws, since intellectual property protection can 
both benefit and harm the poorly funded. On one hand, IP protection 
facilitates funding for those who might otherwise not be able to afford 
to create91 and helps facilitate creation of works and technologies  
that benefit the poor.92 On the other, shorter terms of protection,  
use-based carve-outs, and compulsory licensing also serve distribu-
tive concerns.93 Carve-outs, in particular, subsidize uses that have 
                                                                                                                  
 87. This is not to say that the user is irrelevant to the other three theories; indeed, the 
“remix” user is addressed in all theories. Utilitarian theory seeks to maximize the value of 
works, including the user’s ability to access and use them. See generally Julie E. Cohen,
The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005) (approaching users’ 
rights from a utilitarian standpoint); Shiffrin, supra note 67 (discussing users’ rights, 
including the maintenance of a full and rich commons and the universal accessibility of 
necessities, as elements of a Lockean approach); Tehranian, Parchment, supra note 20 (taking 
a personhood approach to user’s rights). But in each of these theories, the user takes a 
secondary role, whereas in considering distributive justice, the user’s role is central. See 
generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech 
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) [hereinafter, Tushnet, Copy This 
Essay] (taking a distributive approach to users’ rights); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s 
Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003) (taking a distributive approach to 
users’ rights). 
 88. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 172-73 (summarizing “social planning” approach). 
 89. Id. at 192-93; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on 
the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board 
Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 400 (1995) (discussing value of creation as 
engagement of social dialogue). 
 90. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 192. 
 91. See Van Houweling, supra note 29, at 1540-42 (discussing ways in which copyright 
law acts as a subsidy for poorly financed creators). 
 92. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 118-20 (discussing how IP institutions help  
poor consumers). 
 93. See Van Houweling, supra note 29, at 1542-43; see also Fisher, supra note 19, at 172 
(discussing how distributive concerns may inform intellectual property law). 
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social value but high prices for individual users—such as classroom 
copying of copyrighted works or medical treatment using novel tech-
niques.94 Distributive justice theory also recognizes the value of non-
transformative copying, which has the distributive benefits of per-
mitting consumption and re-expression by poorly funded consumers, 
and also benefits participatory culture.95 The theory thus demands 
balancing the distributive value of copying against the distributive 
value of remunerating poorly funded creators. 
IV.   UTILITARIAN THEORY OF NEGATIVE SPACE
 Negative space scholarship has, until now, followed a utilitarian 
model, casting negative spaces as foils for the conventional wisdom 
that strong intellectual property protection acts as an incentive for 
creation. That’s reasonable—in every negative space, creators and 
innovators proceed, either by choice or by operation of law, without 
the incentive of exclusivity. A number of commentators have con-
ducted case studies of low-IP industries and creative cultures from a 
utilitarian perspective, pointing out how those industries or cultures 
idiosyncratically thrive in the absence of significant intellectual 
property protection, either by permitting productive copying or rely-
ing on anti-copying norms. For example, Kal Raustiala and Chris 
Sprigman have noted that the lack of formal intellectual property 
protection for fashion may benefit creation because it fuels the “fash-
ion cycle,” creating trends and rendering them obsolete more quickly 
than exclusivity would.96 Several scholars have noted that despite a 
general lack of intellectual property protection for recipes and foods, 
community norms in the world of haute cuisine tend to protect culi-
nary innovation and place limits on copying.97 Dotan Oliar and Chris 
                                                                                                                  
 94. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (defining copyright fair use); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) 
(exempting medical technique patents from remedies for infringement); Wendy J. Gordon, 
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and 
its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1606-10 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Market 
Failure] (suggesting that fair use exists in part to create positive social externalities not 
otherwise susceptible to bargaining because they do not benefit the copyright holder as 
much as society); Van Houweling, supra note 29, at 1567-73 (suggesting that distributive 
justice should be taken even more into account in carve-outs and fair use). 
 95. See generally Tushnet, Copy This Essay, supra note 87 (discussing value of  
participatory culture).  
 96. See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1 (arguing that 
copying in the fashion industry drives rather than chills innovation); Raustiala & 
Sprigman, Revisited, supra note 4 (clarifying and expanding on the arguments explored in 
Piracy Paradox and responding to scholarly proposals for legislative reform).   
 97.  See Litman, Exclusive, supra note 5, at 44-48 (reexamining the bargain between 
copyright holders and the public that copyright entails and arguing that nascent industry 
can be stimulated by lack of copyright protection); see also Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy 
Paradox, supra note 1, at 1768. See generally Broussard, supra note 5 (arguing for 
copyright protection for chefs’ innovative recipes as original works of authorship); 
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Sprigman have observed that community norms protect stand-up 
comedy well beyond the scope of copyright.98 Others have made simi-
lar observations regarding typefaces,99 open source software,100
wikis,101 hip hop mixtapes,102 and roller derby pseudonyms.103
 These scholars have demonstrated that negative spaces are not 
quite as inconsistent with incentive theory as they might seem. If one 
accepts that other benefits may provide greater incentive than exclu-
sivity would, then negative spaces make sense from a utilitarian per-
spective: negative spaces arise where a lack of protection provides 
those benefits more efficiently than exclusivity would.104 Specifically, 
negative spaces would likely arise in four relatively common situa-
tions: (1) when creation is driven by rewards not reliant on exclusivi-
ty, such as a desire for recognition or community, or a market-based 
advantage such as a network effect or first-mover advantage; (2) 
when exclusivity would harm further creation; (3) when there is high 
public or creator interest in free access without harm to creativity; 
and (4) when creators prefer to reinvest scarce resources in further 
creation than in protection or enforcement of intellectual property, 
i.e., when the cost of protecting or enforcing exclusivity exceeds the 
benefit of pursuing infringers.105
                                                                                                                  
Buccafusco, supra note 1 (exploring the copyrightability of recipes and concluding that 
economic, public policy, and cultural considerations counsel against extending copyright 
protection to recipes); Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 5 (arguing that recipes are better 
protected by self-enforced social norms than by intellectual property law).   
 98. See generally Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1 (arguing that intellectual property 
law is not a cost-effective way to protect creativity of stand-up comedians and that social 
norms provide a substitute for IP law). 
 99. See Fry, supra note 8, at 432-37 (arguing for the continued exclusion of typefaces 
from copyright protection and explaining why that exclusion does not prevent innovation).
See generally Lipton, supra note 8 (calling for Congress, the Copyright Office, and courts to 
reexamine the issue of typeface copyrightability and arguing for at most thin protection for  
digital typefaces).  
 100. See generally Benkler, supra note 9 (analyzing the economic and cultural 
implications of peer production of information). 
 101. See generally Garon, supra note 11 (arguing for a wiki model in which 
collaboration is encouraged but normative expectations of authorship are maintained).
 102. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 114, 140-53 (extending Raustiala and Sprigman’s 
“piracy paradox” from the fashion industry to mixtapes and arguing for a model that 
employs strategic forbearance of copyright enforcement).
 103. See generally Fagundes, supra note 15 (investigating the extra-legal governance 
scheme used to protect derby names to explain the emergence of subcultural IP norms).
 104. Rosenblatt, supra note 15, at 326-36 (discussing doctrinal no man’s land, IP 
forbearance, and use-based carve-outs); see also MERGES, supra note 19, at 85-87, 228-30 
(discussing waiver of rights in the context of collective efficiency, arguing that “[t]he best 
way to facilitate sharing while retaining traditional respect for autonomy is to make it easy 
for owners to waive their rights,” and posing models for such waiver). 
 105. Rosenblatt, supra note 15, at 336-57 (exploring what makes a type of work  
well-suited to IP’s negative space). 
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 This analysis assumes both that intellectual creation relies on in-
centives and that lawmakers, creators, and users will do what is 
most efficient to satisfy their ends. Thus, it posits that every category 
of negative space, represents an area in which creation or innovation 
is incentivized more efficiently without protection than with it. When 
lawmakers create gaps in protection, or when creators in certain are-
as elect not to obtain or enforce protections available to them, they 
must, be doing so either because exclusivity is not the best incentive 
in those areas, or because exclusivity somehow undermines creation 
in those areas. Something else—unrestricted copying, or community 
norms that govern the circumstances of copying—replaces formal 
protection. Copying carried out according to the norms would, in 
turn, act as an incentive to creators through non-exclusivity based 
benefits such as first mover advantages, network effects, reputational 
boosts, community recognition, or reduced costs for further creation.  
 To the extent that intellectual property laws focus on incentives, 
this story works well: it explains the existence of negative spaces 
without undermining the premise that intellectual property exclusiv-
ity can act as an incentive for creation. But what of other justifica-
tions for intellectual property protection? Are there circumstances 
under which a lack of protection is preferable to protection according 
to those philosophies? And if so, what are they?  
V. NON-UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF NEGATIVE SPACE
 Like incentive theory, non-utilitarian theories of intellectual prop-
erty protection have at their hearts the premise that at least some 
degree of exclusivity is good—good because creators deserve exclusiv-
ity as a reward for their labor, good because creators are entitled to 
control over their own personal endeavors, or good because exclusivi-
ty reflects justice, enables beneficial creation, or promotes other simi-
lar values. As with incentive theory, negative spaces may initially 
seem inconsistent with these theories. But for each theory, there are 
circumstances in which a lack of protection vindicates the theoretical 
justification for protection better than protection would. This Part 
identifies those circumstances and characterizes the negative spaces 
they are likely to generate. 
A.   Labor-Desert 
 Whether negative spaces are consistent with labor-desert theory 
depends on what portion of labor-desert theory one focuses on. If the 
theory stated only that “none should reap where another has sown,” 
then negative spaces—arenas in which third parties are legally or 
practically permitted to reap where a creator has sown—would be 
entirely incompatible with natural law. 
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 On the other hand, a more communitarian version of labor-desert 
theory would at least permit, and possibly encourage, large-scale 
copying.106 Under that approach, described by Seana Shiffrin, every 
idea and creation is naturally part of a commons and need not be re-
moved from the commons to be used.107 Some things demand exclu-
sive use—for example, once food is ingested it cannot be shared. In 
contrast, completed intellectual goods are non-rivalrous—that is, the 
use of a creation by one person does not preclude its use by another108
According to this interpretation, the concept of “labor” defines not 
whether something should be removed from the commons, but to
whom rivalrous items should go—so intellectual goods never need to 
be removed from the commons.109 This communitarian version of la-
bor-desert theory would certainly lead to a weak or nonexistent for-
mal protection regime, but it would not necessarily create negative 
spaces. Most ideas and creations would fall into the commons for oth-
ers to build on, but if everything were available to everyone at no 
cost, creation and innovation might grow in some areas—particularly 
the creation of derivative and dependent works—but might stagnate 
in others, such as technologies in which there would be no need to 
invent around the patents of others. 
 The more complete labor-desert theory—the one most scholars 
espouse and this article adopts—resides at neither of these extremes. 
It supports exclusive ownership of intellectual creations by those who 
labor upon them, but only when “enough, and as good” remains for 
others, and when exclusivity would not result in “waste.”110 According 
to this reasoning, creators deserve exclusive intellectual property 
rights in their creations, but should not be granted such rights if or 
when doing so would unduly restrict the size and richness of the 
commons or would “waste” ideas. The Lockean provisos embody po-
tentially conflicting rights: the right of the creator to own her work, 
and the right of the user to consume, communicate, participate, and 
become a creator herself. The laborer deserves to own the fruits of 
her labor—but cannot block access to the commons.111 These princi-
ples, combined, support both exclusive intellectual property rights 
                                                                                                                  
 106. See Shiffrin, supra note 67, at 156-57 (posing the lack of a Lockean justification for 
exclusive control of many intellectual works). 
 107. Id.
 108. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and 
the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1002 (2003) (“Whereas on Blackacre 
every square yard that is propertized diminishes the total left in the commons, in the 
information commons, no such zero-sum game exists.”).  
 109. See Shiffrin, supra note 67, at 156-57. 
 110. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 48-51 (exploring various readings of these provisos). 
 111. See Gordon, Property Right, supra note 66, at 1556-57 (describing the natural 
right to use intellectual creations as part of a common heritage for expressive capacity). 
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and a robust public domain.112 Thus, these principles are not only 
consistent with the existence of negative spaces but also helps ex-
plain when they are likely to arise. 
 Balancing the creator’s right with the need for a commons helps to 
define the boundaries of doctrinal no-man’s land. It requires protec-
tion of expressions but not ideas, even when those ideas may reflect 
the labor of one who originated them, and requires the eventual expi-
ration of intellectual property exclusivity. Everyone has a natural 
right to enjoy access to the raw materials of creation such as facts 
and ideas, and giving laborers exclusivity over them would not leave 
“enough and as good” for others or would “waste” their potential. 
Similarly, creations must be able to enter the commons in some ca-
pacity, as works and marks become part of the fabric of communica-
tion and inventions become part of human thriving.113 An inventor of 
a language can’t keep it to herself—and intellectual creations form 
our common language.114 As Justin Hughes explains, “[T]he more 
generally required by society an idea is, the more important and less 
subject to propertization it becomes.”115 This justifies a number of 
limits on protection—for example, the bar on copyright and trade-
mark protection for functional creations; the bar on copyright and 
patent protection for ideas; the bar on trademark protection for ge-
neric terms; and the limitation on patentability of basic research and  
mathematical formulae.116
 Along similar lines, Locke’s provisos support the existence of use-
based carve-outs in the public interest. For example, granting exclu-
sive use of medical techniques to inventors would not permit the 
poorly financed sick to enjoy medical care that is “enough and as 
good” as the care available to the rich. Granting exclusive use of cop-
yrighted works to authors would harm the public good if it made 
them unavailable for educational use. Lockean theory thus supports 
the Patent Act’s carve-out eliminating damages for infringement of 
medical technique patents,117 and supports fair use of copyrighted 
works for certain educational purposes.118 It requires, however, that 
we balance these carve-outs against the reward to the creator; for 
medical techniques and educational copying, the creator may draw a 
                                                                                                                  
 112. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 35-39 (discussing the complex relationship between 
Locke’s common and the public domain). 
 113. See id.
 114. See Hughes, supra note 26, at 316-17 (discussing computer language as an 
example of a case in which one contribution to society makes other contributions possible). 
 115. Id. at 322. 
 116. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 52, at 1016-17 (discussing concept of 
“seepage,” by which creations reenter the public domain). 
 117. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012).  
 118. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (defining fair use). 
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sufficient reward (such as fame or respect) without exclusivity, while 
for publicly beneficial goods that require more labor to create—such 
as pharmaceutical products—a purely reputational reward may be 
less than the creator deserves. 
 With these theoretical underpinnings in mind, we can see that 
labor-desert theory supports two types of negative spaces: (1) those 
where the most appropriate reward for a creator’s labor is something 
other than exclusivity, and (2) those where exclusive protection 
would harm further creation. 
1.   Non-Exclusivity Rewards 
 The first type of labor-desert negative space lies in the simplest 
core of the theory: that creators should be rewarded for their labor. 
Although the assumption is that this reward should come in the form 
of exclusive ownership, it would be a fallacy to assume that exclusivi-
ty is the most appropriate reward for every creation. When human sur-
vival does not require exclusivity, labor-desert theory would not require 
that creators be rewarded for their labor with exclusivity—quite the 
contrary. To paraphrase Wendy Gordon, the law should provide for 
exclusivity only when copying would interfere with the laborer’s pur-
pose.119 Sometimes, a creator’s “purpose” expressly envisions that 
others will take and use their work, and that they will receive a non-
financial reward such as respect, fame, or community membership. 
Others may desire financial rewards, but expect to reap them 
through network effects or other first mover advantages that depend 
on copying. For these creators, the “ownership” they “deserve” isn’t 
exclusivity—it’s a scheme in which copying is encouraged or permit-
ted under certain circumstances.  
 We can conclude from this that negative spaces are likely to arise 
when returning the works to the commons does not devalue them for 
the creator. In the traditional incentive calculus, intellectual proper-
ty infringement diminishes the reward the creator receives: In a 
world where everything is protected, every instance of unpaid copy-
ing deprives the creator of the payment that she could have received 
for that use.120 Yet there are instances—fashion, for example—in 
which creators feel comfortable reintegrating their works into the 
                                                                                                                  
 119. See Gordon, Property Right, supra note 66, at 1547-48 (“A stranger’s taking of 
another’s labored-on objects is likely to merit legal intervention only if the taking interferes 
with a goal or project to which the laborer has purposely directed her effort. If the taking 
does interfere, the actor needs some special justification for doing it. The scope of the 
laborer’s purpose will help to define the scope of the rights she can assert.”). 
 120. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 40 (“If I copy a work you created, you may be 
harmed even though you may still use your copy. My use may not take the information out 
of your hands; but it may take some money out of your pocket.”). 
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commons with few (or no) restrictions on use, even when the creators 
would have received some benefit from exclusivity.121 Why do they do 
it? One must presume that for these creators, reintegrating their 
works into the commons does not significantly diminish the value  
of the works—rather, it accelerates the fashion cycle and creates  
demand for their next creations.122
 Creators may place a high value on recognition, and therefore 
want their works to be copied, albeit with attribution. Copying of 
fanworks or wiki entries is not in itself problematic for those who 
create them—unless the copying strips the work of attribution.123 The 
recent proliferation of various attribution-focused licenses, including 
creative commons, science commons and GPL/GNU, emphasizes that 
some creators would prefer attention to money.124 Others such as ac-
ademics hope to be rewarded financially, but would rather earn that 
money through recognition, prestige, network effects, or other mar-
ket-based advantages than through licensing.125 It may also occur 
when creators value membership in a community—such as a com-
munity of fanfiction writers or athletes—and create as a manifesta-
tion of their membership in that community. For these creators, 
membership is its own reward, and copying (with attribution) enrich-
es the community in a way that exclusivity would not.126
                                                                                                                  
 121. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 1705, 1718-33 (discussing 
reasons why fashion creators may not seek design patent protection for their works).  
 122. See id.
 123. See Garon, supra note 11, at 101 (discussing attribution on wikis); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Payment In Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 156-60 (2007) [hereinafter Tushnet, Payment in Credit] (“[F]ans 
need to credit—or, depending on the degree to which they distinguish intrafan morality 
from external morality, to get permission to use—other fans' work, whereas they feel free 
to mine the outside world for raw material, as long as the resulting works stay 
noncommercial.”). But cf. Tushnet, Economies of Desire, supra note 19 (characterizing 
many fanwork creators as motivated primarily by a desire to create).  
 124. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of 
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 53-56 (2006) (discussing value of attribution); Garon, supra 
note 11, at 115-16. See generally CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS: CREATIVITY AND 
GENEROSITY IN A CONNECTED AGE (2010) (discussing the attention economy and its products).  
 125. See Daniel F. Spulber, Solving the Circular Conundrum: Communication and 
Coordination in Internet Markets, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 537, 549-50 (2010) (discussing 
network effects in internet markets); Tushnet, Payment in Credit, supra note 123, at 158 
(“Historians, who generally rely on reputation more than money as compensation for their 
contributions to the sum of knowledge, care more about proper attribution within the 
profession than outside it.”). 
 126. See Kieff et al., supra note 10, at 768-81 (discussing community as a value 
trumping protection in athletics); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, 
and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 657 (1997) [hereinafter Tushnet, 
Legal Fictions]. Tushnet explains: 
The ethos of [fan fiction] is one of community, of shared journeys to 
understanding and enjoyment. Regardless of literary value, fan fiction is a 
pleasurable and valuable part of many fans’ experiences. The political importance 
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 This sounds much like the utilitarian theory that negative spaces 
are likely to arise when creators are driven by incentives other than 
exclusivity.127 Indeed, it justifies the same IP forbearance and is like-
ly to result in the same negative spaces. But it has different theoreti-
cal roots; whereas the utilitarian version is concerned with what is 
likely to create the greatest incentive for creators, here the question 
is what acts as the best reward for the creator’s labor in light of the 
creator’s purpose. Thus, this theory is unconcerned with the reward’s 
effect on the creator or her decision to create. This difference high-
lights the value of looking at negative spaces through different theo-
retical lenses: if we rely on utilitarian theory to justify limited protec-
tion in these circumstances—such as limiting protection for sports 
moves because recognition and financial benefits through improved 
reputation will reward sports innovators—we will not necessarily 
betray the natural-law impulse in favor of providing protection. As 
shown below, the same is not necessarily true for every negative 
space justified by incentive theory; for some, a deprivation of protec-
tion might harm other non-utilitarian interests. 
2.   Exclusivity Would Harm Creation  
 The second intersection between labor-desert theory and IP’s neg-
ative spaces lies in the provisos that property rights must leave “as 
much and as good” for others and must not result in waste.128 Nega-
tive spaces are likely to arise when ownership will not satisfy these 
provisos. Creators deserve exclusivity, but also deserve open access to 
the raw materials of creation and, in some circumstances, the fruits 
of other creators’ labor. Labor-desert theory thus supports the propo-
sition that negative spaces are likely to arise when exclusivity would 
harm creation.  
 This reasoning helps to explain the open-source movement and 
similar communities of intellectual property forbearance. These arise 
when creators’ own aim is to expand the commons rather than to 
benefit from exclusive rights to their works. The expanded commons, 
improved resources, and whatever recognition they may gain inci-
                                                                                                                  
of fandom stems from sharing secondary creations. Fans feel that they are 
making significant life choices when they share their work with a broader 
community of like-minded people.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 127. See supra Part IV; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 15, at 342-48 (discussing 
circumstances under which creators are likely to be driven by incentives other than exclusivity). 
 128. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 58-59 (describing how Locke’s “waste” proviso 
undercuts rules that would systematically encourage overclaiming because such overbroad 
IP rights might keep others from building upon the works of others).
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dentally, is all the reward they want or need.129 It is a particularly 
compelling explanation for self-propagating copyleft licenses such as 
the GPL/GNU license and the creative commons share-alike license, 
under which creators are ensured that their work remains in the 
commons even after others build upon it.130
 The theory also manifests in legislative decisions to limit protec-
tion for facts, ideas and functional articles. These statutory gaps cre-
ate doctrinal no-man’s land and open up the commons in areas where 
intellectual property protection would limit access to factual infor-
mation and areas in which creation and innovation require building 
on the works of others. The theory also animates the copyright doc-
trine protecting the arrangement of facts, but not the facts them-
selves,131 and allows creators to build trends in areas such as fashion 
and cuisine.132 In these instances, the law is less concerned with the 
incentive for creation than with maintaining a rich, full commons.  
 Finally, this theory may come into play when considering protec-
tion for works that rely on time-sensitive information. Allowing ex-
clusive ownership of information that would go “stale” if not shared 
may constitute waste of that information, since a restriction on 
someone’s idea to use the information at a particular time would es-
sentially deprive the world of the information.133 The “hot news” doc-
trine allows a sort of ownership over such information by providing 
recourse when one news outlet copies from another;134 Locke’s “waste” 
proviso to labor-desert theory tends to undermine the basis for this 
doctrine, since it permits one party to retain exclusive control over fac-
tual information for the period of time when it would be most valuable 
to others.135
                                                                                                                  
 129. See Benkler, supra note 9, at 423-30 (discussing diverse motivations of  
open-source participants). 
 130. See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013); GNU General Public License, Version 3 (June 29, 2007), 
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html. 
 131. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991) 
(“[O]riginality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of copyright protection in 
directories and other fact-based works.”). 
 132. See Buccafusco, supra note 1, at 1147-48 (discussing the practice of “serial 
collaboration” in cuisine); Raustiala & Sprigman, Revisited, supra note 4, at 1210-12 
(discussing trend-building in fashion). 
 133. See Hughes, supra note 26, at 328-29 (discussing application of Locke’s “non-
waste” condition to intellectual property). 
 134. Int’l News Serv. v. Ass’d Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (establishing “hot news” 
doctrine); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (ratifying 
continued existence of “hot news” doctrine limited to time-sensitive material). 
 135. But see Balganesh, supra note 38, at 426-27 (describing the hot news doctrine as 
encouraging sharing of tips and news information rather than as a tool for exclusive 
dominion over time-sensitive facts). 
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B.   Personality 
 Because personality theory focuses on the inherent relationship 
between creator and creation and posits an inalienable right to con-
trol one’s intellectual creations,136 it may seem entirely inconsistent 
with the existence of negative spaces. The theory may explain why 
moral-rights style norms arise when intellectual property protection 
does not protect a particular type of work—members of the creative 
communities for such work might band together to create pseudo-
protection even when the law does not—but it is less obviously help-
ful in explaining why some creators might prefer a lack of protection. 
After all, negative spaces require creators to cede at least some con-
trol over their creations to the public. Thus, negative spaces are as 
fascinating from a personality standpoint as they are from a utilitari-
an one: why, if control of creations is essential to human flourishing, 
would creators ever engage in IP forbearance? Thus, forbearance-based 
negative spaces seem inconsistent with personality theory: exclusivi-
ty is clearly not crucial to the forbearers’ fundamental human needs.  
 Some varieties of negative space are not only consistent with per-
sonality theory, but seem the inevitable products of personality con-
cerns. These include areas in which community norms protect works 
as “IP without IP,” areas in which creators’ personhood is tied to a 
community of sharing, and areas in which consumer personhood de-
pends on the ability to appropriate and build upon the works of others. 
1.   Norms-Based Protection of Personhood Priorities  
 Some IP forbearance occurs within communities that enforce 
norms-based “IP without IP.” These are communities in which formal 
law—as it exists now—does not satisfy creators’ preferences regard-
ing copying, but the community is sufficiently capable of self-
governance that it can generate a set of norms that serves its per-
sonhood-promoting needs. For example, comedians could, and some-
times do, protect their jokes through copyright law—but they want to 
be associated with their ideas in addition to their expressions, some-
thing that intellectual property law does not accomplish. Thus, the 
majority of comedians do not concern themselves with copyright law, 
but instead turn to community norms for protection.137 The community 
deters copying of both ideas and expressions through professional 
sanctions and, on occasion, physical violence.138 Along similar lines, 
                                                                                                                  
 136. See Hughes, supra note 26, at 334, 348 (explaining that Hegel was comfortable with 
alienation of tangible creations, but had great distaste for alienability of intellectual property). 
 137. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1798 (“One thing is perfectly clear: 
copyright law has played little role in stand-up comedy.”). 
 138. See id. at 1796-97 (describing physical violence as punishment for joke-stealing). 
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roller derby participants could rely on trademark law to protect their 
pseudonyms (and occasionally have done so), but they want to set 
their own community standards, rather than ceding control to the 
courts.139 Participants avoid duplicating pseudonyms using an official 
database and a detailed system akin to trademark law for determin-
ing when two pseudonyms are too similar.140 Thus, in IP-without-IP 
communities, creators’ personhood interests are better satisfied with-
out the operation of law than with it—and in fact, they may be dou-
bly satisfied through the operation of community norms, since inno-
vators enjoy the personhood value of controlling their creations while 
also enjoying the personhood value of belonging to a community.  
 Similarly, in other forbearance-based communities, copying is 
conditional on attribution. While scholars yearn for citations, aca-
demic plagiarism is the gravest of sins.141 Fan fiction creators are 
generous and fastidious about giving credit.142 All six of the creative 
commons licenses demand it.143 Although these communities do not 
ensure creator “control” over works, they do protect the originator’s 
personhood interest in being associated with his or her creation—an 
interest that, in most circumstances, is not protected by intellectual 
property law.144 The penalty for copyright or patent infringement is 
damages—which do little to vindicate a personhood interest in con-
trol. On the other hand, a community penalty for plagiarism might be 
banishment or social shaming.145 True, attribution-based communi-
ties require creators to relinquish control over whether, how, and to 
what extent, their work is copied and modified—but in exchange, 
they provide the creator with recognition. Furthermore, the commu-
nity dictates the degree of permissible copying and modification. 
Among chefs, copying is limited and predicated on transformation.146
Under some circumstances, academics encourage copying.147 Thus, 
                                                                                                                  
 139. See Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1121-27. 
 140. See id. at 1115-19. 
 141. See Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Plagiarism: Legal and Ethical Implications for the 
University, 37 J.C. & U.L. 1, 64-65 (2010) (discussing consequences to faculty of plagiarism). 
 142. See Tushnet, Legal Fictions, supra note 126, at 664 (describing the ritual of 
attributive copyright disclaimers in fan fiction).
 143. About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 144. See Latourette, supra note 141, at 45-50 (discussing distinction between 
plagiarism and copyright infringement). 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 63-64 (describing penalties for plagiarism in academic community). 
 146. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 5, at 192-93 (“[I]t is not honorable for chefs 
to exactly copy recipes developed by other chefs.”). 
 147. See Aoki, Part II, supra note 12, at 204 (describing “considerable dismay in the 
scientific community” when Professor Walter Gilbert sought copyright protection for the 
human genome, something that scientists considered “the essential inheritance of the 
human species”); Strandburg, supra note 12, at 108 (describing a “communalism norm that 
requires making research results freely available to the community”). 
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while members in these communities trade ownership for attribution, 
they do not relinquish all control over the ways in which their crea-
tions will be used. In these ways, the lack of formalized intellectual 
property protection, when paired with the presence of informal com-
munity protection, supports certain creators’ personhood interests 
more than the law does. This is not to say that norms are inherently 
better at protecting personhood interests than formal law is; but law 
provides a one-size-fits-some solution. For communities capable of 
being governed by norms, norms are more customizable than law. 
Were formal law to adopt the personhood-promoting rules these 
communities preferred, they could rely on formal law. Since it does 
not, they must rely on norms. 
2.   Communities of Sharing 
 Human flourishing demands not only creation, but also the ability 
to connect with others to form communities of interest. These per-
sonhood interests are closely linked, since communities often develop 
around creative endeavors; people define themselves not only by 
what they make but by association with others who make similar 
things. For example, authors of fan fiction,148 writers of open source 
software,149 roller derby participants,150 wiki contributors,151 chefs,152
scholars,153 and athletes belong to communities defined by innova-
tion, creation, and the sharing of creations among community mem-
bers.154 In these communities, the act of creating supports the per-
sonhood interest of community regardless of whether the work is pro-
tected by intellectual property law. The communities—and hence, 
community members’ identities—rely on a philosophy of sharing.155
When creators’ identities are closely tied to a philosophy of sharing, 
intellectual property protection and enforcement actually under-
                                                                                                                  
 148. See generally Tushnet, Payment in Credit, supra note 123 (discussing community 
among creators of fan fiction). 
 149. See Rebecca Giblin, Physical World Assumptions and Software World Realities 
(and Why There are More P2P Software Providers than Ever Before), 35 COLUM. J. L. &
ARTS 57, 102 (2011) (identifying “strong norms in the software development community 
that promote sharing [software secrets] with the world”).  
 150. See Fagundes, supra note 15, at 1108-10. 
 151. See Garon, supra note 11, at 106-11 (discussing community value of sharing and 
curation in wiki and Internet communities; indeed, among wiki contributors, community 
holds an even higher value than attribution). 
 152. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 5, at 193-94 (discussing community of 
sharing and hospitality norms among chefs). 
 153. Strandburg, supra note 12, at 108-09 (describing community-enforced penalties for 
failing to share among academic scientists, including “loss of esteem” and “denial of the 
scarce resources of research funding and attention”). 
 154. See Magliocca, supra note 10, at 876-77 (discussing effects on innovation of 
community among athletes). 
 155. See supra notes 148-154 and sources cited therein. 
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mines their personhood concerns. It is no surprise, therefore, that in 
sharing-based communities, IP forbearance is widespread. 
3.   Consumer Personhood  
 Personality theory also contemplates that the creators of works 
may not be the only ones with personhood interests in those works. 
Consumers may have such interests as well. Personhood may be ex-
pressed through the consumption of creations; for example, a person’s 
identity may be very closely tied to the clothes she wears, the televi-
sion she enjoys, or the technology she uses.156 Human flourishing de-
pends not only on the ability to create, but also the ability to use the 
creations of others to control, retell, and manipulate the story of one’s 
life.157 But this consumption-based personhood interest may be at 
odds with the creator’s interest in controlling the disposition of her 
work. David Byrne doesn’t want his music associated with a con-
servative politician.158 J.K. Rowling is unhappy with sexually explicit 
“Harry Potter” fan fiction.159 Abercrombie & Fitch doesn’t want its 
fashion designs to be associated with reality television star Michael 
“The Situation” Sorrentino.160 And yet the politician, the fan fiction 
author, and the fashion plate all have personhood interests in their 
re-expression that are as real as the originators’.  
                                                                                                                  
 156. See Tehranian, Parchment, supra note 20, at 27-30 (discussing the intermingling 
of personality and consuming of media and goods). 
157. See Gordon, Property Right, supra note 66, at 1536 (discussing the personhood 
value of manipulating the narratives of shared cultural meaning). 
 158. Similar examples abound. In the last few years, the band Survivor sued Newt 
Gingrich for using its song “Eye of the Tiger” as a campaign anthem; Tom Petty requested 
that Michele Bachmann stop using his song “American Girl”; Jackson Browne and John 
Mellencamp both took issue with John McCain’s use of their music, and David Byrne extracted 
an apology from former Florida Governor Charlie Crist for the use of the song “Road to 
Nowhere” in a campaign advertisement. See Todd Martens, Survivor Songwriter Wants 
Gingrich to Stop Using “Eye of the Tiger,” Pop & Hiss, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2012, 12:44 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/music_blog/2012/01/newt-gingrich-eye-of-the-tiger-survivor.html.  
 159. See Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, Harry Potter in the Restricted Section,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi?NoticeID=522 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
Although many authors are content to ignore fan fiction or even celebrate it, others have 
sought to use the law to silence it. In 2012, the estate of Marion Zimmer Bradley sued fan 
author Mary Battle, asserting that her works infringed the author’s copyrights and 
trademark rights. See Complaint at 2-3, Marion Zimmer Bradley Literary Works Trust v. 
Battle, No. 3:12-cv-00073-MEJ (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2012). The same estate contacted the 
Organization for Transformative Works’ “Archive Of Our Own,” asserting that 
noncommercial fan fiction stories posted there infringed of Bradley’s trademark and 
copyright rights. See Letter from Rebecca Tushnet, Professor, Georgetown University Law 
Center, to Ann Sharp, Representative, The Marion Zimmer Bradley Literary Works Trust 
(Feb. 28, 2012) (on file with author).  
 160. See Elizabeth Holmes, Abercrombie and Fitch Offers to Pay ‘The Situation’ To Stop 
Wearing Its Clothes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2011, 7:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/ 
2011/08/16/abercrombie-and-fitch-offer-to-pay-the-situation-to-stop-wearing-their-clothes/. 
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 This conflict is not easily resolved through the operation of intel-
lectual property law, although some have tried to use it for that pur-
pose. Rather, the tension creates pockets of negative space. Through 
a combination of statutory exceptions and creator forbearance, the 
law permits some personhood-promoting uses while prohibiting oth-
ers. The law is less likely to protect against customization—that is, 
the consumer’s use of a work to express personhood—than it is to 
protect against less personal copying. Take fashion, for example. 
Since fashion works signify the identity of the wearer in addition to 
the creativity of the maker, it would deprive the wearer of a person-
hood outlet to deprive her of sartorial options such as fashion trends. 
The law justifies the non-protection of fashion on the basis of “func-
tionality,”161 but in a sense, the law seems more concerned with per-
sonal customization than with functionality per se. To the extent 
that the law does prevent copying of fashion works, it bars literal copy-
ing of distinctive works—counterfeiting—and bars literal copying of 
ornamental features subject to design patents but permits copying that 
modifies the garments to create expressive trends.162 Or take fan fiction: 
copyright law’s fair use doctrine permits fans to write noncommercial 
transformative works that modify works for the purpose of expressing 
                                                                                                                  
 161. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that “the design of a useful article . . . shall be 
considered a [copyrightable] work only if, and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article”); 
17 U.S.C. § 113 (2012) (declaring that the Copyright Act “does not afford, to the owner of 
copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with 
respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those 
afforded to such works under the law”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 
U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001) (A design element is functional, and thus not protectable by 
trademark law, if it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or if it “affects the cost 
or quality of the article.” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 
n.10 (1982))). 
 162. See Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1, at 1722-24 (describing 
how non-identical copying promotes the creation of trends). This is achieved through 
various legal doctrines. First, to the extent the garment is protected by trademark law, 
once it is modified to any significant degree it is no longer confusingly similar to the 
original and thus no longer infringes. See Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 
43, 46 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that dissimilarity “can be dispositive” and demand a holding 
of no trademark infringement). Second, to the extent the garment is protected by a design 
patent, the law is similarly concerned with whether an “ordinary observer” would find the 
design and accused product “substantially the same.” Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 
543 F.3d 665, 670, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). Finally, trademark law’s reverse passing 
off doctrine protects those who buy and then customize garments–even if they re-sell those 
modified garments, they are permitted to do so even with very slight modifications. The 
only thing barred is “mere repackaging.” Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (holding that while mere repackaging would have constituted 
reverse passing off, even “arguably minor” modifications to content rendered copied  
videotapes noninfringing). 
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the fans’ personhood but prohibits copying for non-transformative, 
commercial (i.e., less personhood-promoting) purposes.163
C.   Distributive Justice 
 Distributive justice theory seems the easiest to square with the 
existence of negative spaces. Distributive justice favors a level of pro-
tection sufficient to fund creation by creators of all wealth levels, but 
it also favors ample access by even the most poorly funded of con-
sumers.164 Thus, distributive justice supports forbearance by well-
funded creators and doctrinal carve-outs for uses that benefit users 
and society. But with further examination, the existence of negative 
spaces challenges distributive justice theory just as it challenges util-
itarian, labor-desert, and personality theories. While distributive jus-
tice may not demand strong intellectual property protection, it does 
not immediately indicate when—if ever—the lack of intellectual 
property protection would promote creation.  
 For example, when there is a high public interest in free (i.e., no-
cost) 165 access to creations and innovations, lawmakers are more like-
ly to leave such creations unprotected by intellectual property law by 
creating doctrinal no-man’s land and facilitating use-based carve-
outs. For example, Congress has determined that there should be no 
damages for infringement of patents covering medical procedures;166
that descriptive terms should not be protectable as trademarks un-
less they have already acquired secondary meaning;167 and that peo-
ple should be able to copy works of authorship for the purpose of crit-
icism, commentary, or classroom use.168 In each of these situations, 
the interests of the public—health, in the first instance, and speech 
in the latter two—trump the interests of the creator. These carve-
outs serve the distributive concerns of consumers, but do so at the 
expense of creators’ distributive interests. It is possible that, with 
their works carved out of protection, innovators may not be able to 
                                                                                                                  
 163. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (stating fair use factors, including “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature”); Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (holding that fair use inquiry asks 
“whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative’ ”). 
 164. Van Houweling, supra note 29, at 1539-46 (posing a distributive model of copyright). 
 165. In intellectual property discourse, there are two types of “free.” Richard Stallman 
is credited with coining the terms “free (as in beer)” and “free (as in speech),” respectively. 
RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY 65 (2002). “Free (as in beer)” refers 
to no-cost availability, whereas “free (as in speech)” refers to rights. For example, one has 
an unabridged right to political speech (because there is a “freedom” to engage in political 
speech), but no right to broadcast a political advertisement on television without paying 
(because advertising is not “free”). See id.
 166. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012). 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012). 
 168. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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afford to make the relevant advancements and would have to turn to 
other pursuits for income. For that reason, a high public value to ac-
cess is not itself enough to create negative space. Although a strong 
public interest in free access is likely to weigh in favor of a gap in 
protection, the creation of such a gap may be neutral or possibly even 
harmful to creation. 
 Distributive justice predicts that creation and innovation would 
benefit from a lack of protection in two circumstances: (1) when there 
is a strong creator interest in dissemination of works; and (2) when 
free access to existing works enables further creation. The former is 
likely to serve as a basis for intellectual property forbearance and doc-
trinal carve-outs; the latter is likely to serve as a basis for doctrinal  
no-man’s land. 
1.   Strong Creator Interest in Dissemination of Works Regardless 
of the Consumer’s Ability to Pay 
 Some creators have an interest in wide distribution of their 
works—and in particular, do not want consumption of their works to 
depend on the consumer’s ability to pay. They may engage in IP for-
bearance or may operate in areas of doctrinal no-man’s land or use-
based carve-outs. Bloggers and viral video-makers create with the 
hope and expectation that their works will be quoted, embedded in e-
mails, and retweeted. Doctors invent medical techniques with the 
expectation that they will be widely used to help people; they operate 
for the public good and without significant patent protection.169
Scholars write journal articles with the purpose of sharing their in-
sights with all, regardless of funding level, and with the expectation 
that other scholars will read and cite their works.170 Creators of open-
source software often engage in IP forbearance with the (broadly 
stated) purpose of improving system functionality for users of all in-
comes and distribute it at no cost with the expectation and hope that 
others will use it to generate further system improvements to benefit 
the software-using public at large.171 Athletes seldom seek intellectu-
al property protection for their moves because doing so would violate 
the principles of sport and deprive others of an “even playing  
field”; they believe that society—or at least the athletic microcosm 
thereof—benefits from free access to athletic innovations.172 Along 
                                                                                                                  
 169. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) (limiting remedies for infringement of medical 
technique patents).
 170. It may be a different matter for scholarly publishers.  
 171. See Benkler, supra note 9, at 406-23 (describing information gains and allocation 
gains from collective software creation). 
172. See Magliocca, supra note 10, at 876-77 (describing sportsmanship norms  
of sharing). 
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similar lines, people who create religious works or works of political 
advocacy may be sufficiently interested in spreading the word that 
they want to minimize costs to the consumer.173 The point is to get 
the word out, and it may not matter whether that word is copied, imi-
tated, attributed, or paid for.174
 Viewed from a utilitarian standpoint, one could say that each of 
these situations is one in which exclusivity does not provide a com-
plete incentive for creation; as Wendy Gordon’s work indicates, they 
are appropriate targets for use-based carve-outs because they involve 
social values that are not easily monetized, such as scholarship, polit-
ical speech, noncommercial uses, and human health.175 Yet we should 
resist the temptation to turn this analysis into a market-based one. 
Here, although legislators may have a utilitarian interest in promot-
ing creation beyond what the market will bear, that utilitarian inter-
est is not what creates negative space. What creates negative space  
is the creator’s interest in producing outside the exclusivity-based  
market model, with the aim of what the creator sees as a social  
benefit—education, superior products, religious faith, and the like.176
 In each of these circumstances, a desire for distributive justice 
generates creation in the absence of intellectual property exclusivity 
in a way that would not be possible in an IP-protected environment. 
For each of these creators, the drive to create would diminish if they 
could not attain their objective: low-cost access by a wide range of users.  
2.   When Copying Generates Creation 
 As discussed above, distributive concerns may drive lawmakers to 
limit intellectual property protection or carve out particular uses 
from liability; these decisions generate negative space, in turn, when 
                                                                                                                  
 173. Cf. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by 
Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008) 
(discussing Catholic Church’s exercise of copyright protection in order to offset production 
costs and generate income). 
 174. Not every creator with a strong interest in dissemination is driven by altruism. 
Creators and innovators who rely on network effects for their profits may prefer that their 
products be copied by users of all income levels, but they are not concerned with the social 
good. Adobe, for example, is surely thrilled when users copy their PDF reader, because it means 
that more users will ultimately purchase (more expensive) PDF creation software—not because 
they believe that PDFs result in a more just society. Advertisers might prefer that their 
copyrighted works be copied and distributed as widely as possible so that they might sell 
more goods—not because they believe that the advertisements themselves are culturally 
enriching. Thus, although IP forbearance in these areas may result in broader access to 
works that might otherwise be protected, it is not necessarily an example of  
distributive justice. 
 175. See Gordon, Market Failure, supra note 94, at 1631-32. 
 176. See Cohen, Lochner, supra note 74, at 489-94 (discussing social planning 
ramifications of fair use). 
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they serve the interests of under-funded creators by making the raw 
materials of creation affordable. For example, use-based carve-outs 
may permit productive uses that would otherwise infringe. The doc-
trine of fair use provides relatively free access to scholarly users for 
research purposes, who in turn use that free access as to enable crea-
tion of further scholarly developments. Poorly funded documentari-
ans can rely on the doctrine of nominative fair use to incorporate oth-
ers’ trademarks in their films.177 Along the same lines, doctrinal no-
man’s land makes the raw materials of creation available to all. In-
ventors need not worry about having to license algorithms or basic 
science, and creators of copyrightable works need not be concerned if 
they want to build on existing facts or useful articles.  
 Likewise distributive justice-driven IP forbearance may generate 
creation by making raw materials affordable. For example, in the 
copyleft movement creators license their works via creative commons 
or the GPL/GNU license, availing them for future creators to build 
on.178 The self-proliferating nature of these licenses compels the fol-
low-on creator to make his or her work freely available on the same 
terms. This not only demonstrates a creator interest in distributive 
justice, but also creates negative space by making creation easier and 
cheaper for future “generations” of creators.  
VI.   NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
 As demonstrated above, the various theories of intellectual prop-
erty align with different aspects of negative spaces. Each theory pre-
dicts negative spaces, but locates them in different places. Utilitarian 
theory puts negative spaces where protection would harm incentives; 
labor-desert theory puts them where sharing rewards creators more 
than exclusivity; personhood theory puts them where sharing sup-
ports the identity interests of creators and/or users; and distributive 
justice theory puts them where copying would benefit society.  
 The benefit of examining all four theories at once is identifying the 
intersections—the places where all four theories predict and support 
the existence of negative spaces. In these areas, the major justifica-
                                                                                                                  
 177. See Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always Right: Producer-Based 
Limits on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 352 (2007), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/25/tushnet.html. But see Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, 
Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011 
(2009) [hereinafter Rosenblatt, Trademark Use in Entertainment] (describing uncertainty 
of nominative fair use defense); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in 
Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1903, 1914-15 (2007) (describing the chilling 
effects of having to rely on uncertain defenses in documentary filmmaking). 
 178. See sources cited supra note 130. 
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tions of intellectual property law hold that a lack of protection is supe-
rior to protection for all concerned—creators, consumers, and society  
at large.  
 First, all four theories predict that negative spaces will arise when 
the original creator receives a benefit from copying—such as attribu-
tion, recognition, community, or market advantage—that she would 
not receive from exclusivity. Each theory approaches the situation 
differently, but with clear commonalities. From a utilitarian stand-
point, negative spaces will likely arise when creators are primarily 
motivated by a desire for an alternative benefit. From a labor-desert 
standpoint, negative spaces are likely to arise when the alternative 
benefit is a more fitting reward for creation. From a personhood  
perspective, negative spaces are likely to arise when creators belong 
to norms-based communities that honor such alternative benefits; 
and from a distributive justice perspective, negative spaces are likely 
to arise when creators are strongly interested in dissemination of  
their works. 
 Second, all four philosophies support the existence of negative 
spaces when creators have a strong interest in disseminating their 
creations. Utilitarian theory favors negative spaces in such circum-
stances—for example, for advertisements, religious works, or open-
source software—since greater dissemination acts as its own incen-
tive for creation. Labor-desert theory favors negative spaces in such 
circumstances not only because dissemination is its own reward, but 
also because it leads to a richer commons. Personality theory favors 
negative spaces in such circumstances when the creator has a philo-
sophical interest in sharing or when sharing builds community  
among creators.  
 Third, all four philosophies indicate that negative spaces are like-
ly to arise in fields where later works build closely on their forbears, 
such as fashion, cuisine, and wiki creation. Utilitarian theory holds 
that creators in these circumstances—who know that they will  
have to rely on the works of others as the raw material for their own 
creations—have an incentive to make their own works available as 
part of a reciprocal community. Labor-desert theory favors these to 
the extent they foster a rich commons. Personality theory favors 
them when creators belong to communities of sharing, and distribu-
tive justice favors them to the extent they permit poorly financed 
creators to use the raw materials of creation at low cost. Which 
leads to the question: what normative conclusions can we draw from 
these three commonalities?  
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A.   Naming Names 
 Intellectual property protection should not rely solely on exclusivi-
ty. When alternative benefits such as attribution are available with-
out legal intervention—such as when they are enforced by communi-
ties of creators and consumers—then the status quo might be suffi-
cient. But there should be ways for creators to take advantage of non-
exclusivity benefits when they cannot, or would prefer not to, depend 
on a community to ensure their availability. Likewise, creators 
should be able to take advantage of non-exclusivity benefits without 
also generating the potentially chilling effects of traditional intellec-
tual property law. Copyrights, trademarks, and patents signal to the 
world that one must pay to use a particular work or face a potential 
infringement lawsuit. This triggers risk aversion; people won’t use 
protected works even under circumstances in which those works’ cre-
ators would not pursue them for infringement—indeed, even under 
circumstances in which those works’ creators would prefer that they 
be used. Ideally, the law should encourage use in those circumstances 
rather than discourage it.  
 Specifically, the law should be structured with attribution in 
mind. To be clear, automatic inclusion of an attribution right atop 
existing protections would likely cause enforcement and adjudication 
difficulties, and could be a disincentive to create. Creators would 
have to fear not only traditional infringement suits, but also attribu-
tion-based suits in situations where attribution is difficult.179 But giv-
ing creators the option of an attribution right instead of an exclusivi-
ty right would be more dependable than relying on community norms 
and would serve all four theories’ policy interests. Providing an at-
tribution alternative should be preferable to exclusivity from a labor-
desert perspective, as it would provide creators their preferred re-
ward without diminishing the commons. It would satisfy personhood 
concerns for those creators who value sharing. And it would satisfy 
distributive justice by balancing incentives with a broad commons.  
 Thus, it is worth considering the creation of a minimally formal 
attribution right that might serve as an alternative to copyright or 
                                                                                                                  
 179. Rebecca Tushnet has wisely pointed out that in the copyright context, attribution 
may be difficult to achieve in certain circumstances such as live broadcasting; that an 
attribution right might be difficult to adjudicate for works derived from multiple sources; 
and that it is difficult to attribute works made for hire and works owned by multiple rights 
holders. See Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
789, 789 (2007) (positing that “identifying authors is beyond” the grasp of American 
copyright law). Outside the copyright context, attribution becomes even more difficult. 
Should an automobile maker be required to identify the inventors of every patented part in 
the car? How could the maker of a smartphone be expected to identify the inventors of every 
piece of software incorporated into the phone? It is harder yet to envision how a trademark 
attribution right would work, since trademarks are themselves source identifiers.  
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patent protection,180 which would provide creators the opportunity to 
elect between exclusivity or an attribution right.181 Less dramatic ap-
proaches include considering attribution among the factors in adjudi-
cating copyright fair use, imposing an attribution requirement as a 
form of injunctive relief, or considering attribution as an ameliorat-
ing factor in assessing damages. Whatever the conclusion, however, 
encouraging attribution would serve the aims of all four intellectual 
property philosophies. It would promote creation and innovation by 
giving a greater number of creators the legal means to extract recog-
nition and network-effect benefits from their creations; it would pro-
vide creators a way to elect their reward of choice without diminish-
ing the commons; it would provide creators with a mechanism for be-
ing personally associated with their works; and it would reduce the 
price of intellectual creations for poorly funded consumers.  
B.   Leaving Room for Productive Infringement 
 All four theories suggest that negative spaces are likely to arise 
when new creations and innovations build closely on their forbears. 
In these situations, infringing activity adds value to existing works or 
produces new creations without diminishing the value of the original 
work. This implies that the law should leave room for productive  
infringement—infringement that does not compete with the original 
in such a way as to unduly undermine incentives or rewards for crea-
tion, but facilitates a broad, rich commons of low- or no-cost raw ma-
terials for follow-on creation.182
 Creators have broad ability to create cultural meaning, and intel-
lectual property exclusivity gives creators broad power to control the 
expression of that cultural meaning.183 This exclusivity provides the 
utilitarian advantage of encouraging works, marks, and inventions 
that have cultural meanings—but it harms the personhood interests 
of consumers who want to incorporate that cultural meaning into 
their self-expression, it harms the distributive justice interests of 
those who want to participate in cultural community at low cost, and 
from a labor-desert standpoint, it shrinks the commons. One way to 
                                                                                                                  
 180. Identifying the best formal approach is beyond the scope of this Article, but others 
have attempted to do so. For example, Catherine Fisk offers a more detailed discussion of 
various pros and cons of formalizing attribution, as well as ideas for operationalizing  
such a formal system so as to promote the benefits of recognition. See Fisk, supra note 124,  
at 108-17.
 181. This may be what many creators (incorrectly) believe they are doing when they 
select to license their work under a Creative Commons attribution-only license. 
 182. Note that the creation of remix technology (not to mention the resulting remixes 
themselves) is also a form of advancing the useful arts.  
 183. See Tehranian, Parchment, supra note 20, at 18-19 (discussing the creation of 
cultural meaning by creators and intellectual property law’s ability to control that meaning). 
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mediate these concerns is to provide the owner with control over re-
production of his or her creation or innovation, but not over its cul-
tural and social meaning.  
 One step toward accomplishing this is to provide a genuine oppor-
tunity for creators to abandon their copyrights. Patent law provides 
for abandonment of one’s inventions and dedication to the public; 
trademark law permits abandonment of marks in a variety of 
ways.184 Each of these measures creates opportunities for follow-on 
inventions and creations. Yet it is strikingly difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to abandon one’s copyright.185 Many creators may believe this is 
what they are doing when they license their works under Creative 
Commons and similar licenses, yet such licenses actually create addi-
tional layers of protection under contract law rather than freeing the 
work in any permanent sense.186 Permitting creators to disavow copy-
right protection would enlarge the commons, permit consumers to 
use the work’s cultural meaning without fear of liability, and enable 
creators with personal philosophies of sharing to express their per-
sonhood outside a discrete community of sharers.187 Moreover, when a 
creator decides not to enforce her copyright, prospective copiers may 
fear that the creator will change her mind and sue; disavowal will 
eliminate that risk and its chilling effect. Nor would it require radical 
change in the law; all it would require would be a return to the past, 
when instead providing automatic protection upon fixation, copyright 
law was a formalities-based opt-in system.188 That way, creators who 
do not wish their works to be protected could simply refrain from reg-
istering them or renewing their registrations.  
 But abandonment opportunities cannot resolve the matter  
entirely—and current copyright and trademark fair use doctrines 
and patent experimental use doctrines cannot either. Existing law 
contemplates liability for productive infringement that, for example, 
                                                                                                                  
 184. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (2012) (providing for loss of right to patent if inventor 
has abandoned the invention); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 
605, 614 (1950) (“What is not specifically claimed is dedicated to the public.”); see also 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (providing for abandonment of a mark “[w]hen its use has been 
discontinued with intent not to resume such use” and “[w]hen any course of conduct of the 
owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the 
generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or 
otherwise to lose its significance as a mark”). 
 185. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright 
Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 391-99 
(2010) (describing copyright abandonment as a “paper tiger”). 
 186. See Dreyfuss, supra note 48, at 1449 (discussing Creative Commons’ dependence 
on formal intellectual property protection). 
 187. See MERGES, supra note 19, at 85-87 (posing that creator autonomy demands 
property rights that are “widely available” but “easy to waive”).
 188. See Tushnet, Copy This Essay, supra note 87, at 543 (discussing the transformation 
of copyright system from opt-in system to one of automatic protection). 
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replicates large portions of a copyrighted work,189 creates a trade-
mark likelihood of confusion,190 or builds upon a patented invention 
for any purposes beyond mere intellectual curiosity.191 Instead, I sug-
gest something akin to the proposal by Christopher Sprigman that 
noncounterfeiting copyright and trademark infringement should de-
pend on whether an infringement competes with the original.192 Alt-
hough Sprigman does not discuss patent law, his theory can be ex-
tended by analogy to promote productive patent infringements such 
as experimental uses. Another, less dramatic approach would elimi-
nate injunctive relief and/or limit the opportunities for damages in 
the context of productive infringement. This would not only reduce 
the risks to those who engage in productive infringement but also 
permit the growth of beneficial negative spaces. A reduction in reme-
dies will decrease the potential benefit of pursuing infringers so that 
only those who have experienced genuine harm, or those with deep 
pocketbooks, will be interested in pursuing productive infringers. 
 From a utilitarian perspective, by definition, productive infringe-
ment does not harm incentives. Unlicensed derivative works do not 
harm the financial incentives of authors who aren’t positioned to ex-
ploit licensing markets, and unforeseeable copying, as a matter of 
logic, cannot affect incentives.193 Creating space for productive in-
fringement also provides an incentive benefit because it allays the 
chilling effect of risk-aversion: in areas where creators build closely 
on their forbears, they may elect not to create for fear of suit; but if 
productive infringement were permitted, they could create without 
fear. The proliferation of attribution-based noncommercial copyright 
licenses suggests that broadening fair use-style exemptions for the 
creation of noncommercial derivative works will likely promote both 
initial creation of works and further creation. An explicit exemption 
for expressive and/or nominative uses of trademarks would generate 
similar public benefits without impairing the value of marks.194 By 
the same token, the fragile negative space of academic science im-
plies that broadening the experimental use exception for patent in-
                                                                                                                  
 189. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing copyright holders an exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work). 
 190. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, Trademarks in Entertainment, supra note 177, at 1040-42 
(describing circumstances in which expressive uses of trademarks may create, or come to 
create, likelihood of confusion). 
 191. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (articulating 
that “experimental use” defense is limited to acts that are “solely for amusement” and not 
“in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business”). 
 192. Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 317, 334-41 (2009). 
 193. See id.
 194. Cf. Rosenblatt, Trademarks in Entertainment, supra note 177, at 1073-74 (proposing 
exemption for “artistically relevant” uses of trademarks in expressive works). 
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fringement would benefit, rather than stifle, innovation.195 But the 
benefits of productive infringement extend beyond the utilitarian: a 
productive infringement doctrine would serve labor-desert ideals by 
expanding the commons while at the same time not permitting in-
fringers to reap precisely where their predecessors have sown. Simi-
larly, productive infringement advances distributive justice by lower-
ing the cost of production and reducing the risks to those who engage 
in productive infringement, without disrupting intellectual property 
exclusivity’s ability to finance creators through exclusive rights in 
commercial reproduction of their works. A productive infringement 
doctrine would also serve personhood interests of creators and con-
sumers alike: remix creators and innovators in highly accretive areas 
like the software industry would be able to form communities based 
on their activities without fear of exposing themselves to infringe-
ment liability, and consumers would be able to express themselves 
through customization without facing intellectual property wrath.196
C.   Resisting the Urge to Overprotect  
 Finally, the negative space analysis demonstrates that doctrinal 
limits on protection are not necessarily bad for creators under any of 
the four theoretical approaches. This analysis can help resolve cur-
rent protection debates. A steady stream of scholars and business 
interests have urged broad interpretations of current infringement 
laws or proposed new protections that would fill in the gaps of doctri-
nal no-man’s land. Lobbyists and scholars alike have argued for stat-
utory protection of fashion designs; the “hot news” doctrine has expe-
rienced a recent resurgence; various constituencies have encouraged 
us to adopt European database protection standards; and the debate 
over the patentability of business methods rages on.197 We should re-
sist the urge to “protect first and ask questions later.” 
                                                                                                                  
 195. Dreyfuss, supra note 48, at 1469-70. A more dramatic application of the same 
principle might categorically eliminate patent suits by nonpracticing entities. To my mind, 
such an extreme step would be counter-productive as nonpracticing entities often provide 
key sources of income for inventors and, as such, have become part of the invention 
economy. Thus, while eliminating the opportunity for nonpracticing entities to sue would 
likely permit more opportunities for follow-on invention, it would also have a significant, 
indirect undermining effect on the incentives for initial invention. 
 196. See Tehranian, Parchment, supra note 20, at 24-27 (discussing the relationship 
between customization and personhood). 
 197. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 38, at 421-22 (discussing the relatively recent 
resurgence of the “hot news” misappropriation doctrine); C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, 
The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1184-90 (2009) 
(proposing tailored protection for fashion designs); Jad Mills, Patentable Subject Matter in 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 377 (2011) (discussing 
effect of ruling on patentability of business method patents); see also supra notes 34-38 and 
accompanying text. 
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 This is particularly true for information that has formerly resided 
in the public domain—facts;198 functional elements of works of au-
thorship and source identifiers;199 physical phenomena, products of 
nature, abstract ideas, basic research;200 and the like. The public do-
main is a commons of information that serves as the raw material for 
creation and belongs to no one. From a labor-desert perspective, free-
dom to use this information is crucial, and it is not appropriable un-
less appropriation is necessary.201 Even though one may expend con-
siderable labor in gathering such information, permitting it to be ap-
propriated merely by virtue of that labor would decimate the com-
mons and unacceptably stifle creation.202 A broad public domain is 
also crucial for distributive justice; without it, poorly funded infor-
mation consumers and those who use the information to create would 
effectively be denied access to information and raw materials.203
From a personality standpoint, factual information (aside from in-
formation about the self) lacks the self-association of originality and 
thus does not merit protection.204 Only the utilitarian calculus sup-
ports, to any extent, the intellectual property protection of facts and 
similar public domain information on the theory that creators need 
incentives to engage in the toil of information gathering, arrange-
ment, and dissemination.  
                                                                                                                  
 198. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991) 
(defining the originality requirement for copyright). 
 199. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered 
a [copyrightable] work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are 
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”); 17 U.S.C. § 113 
(2012) (The Copyright Act “does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that 
portrays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, 
distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works 
under the law . . . .”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (A 
design element is functional, and thus not protectable by trademark law, if it is “essential 
to the use or purpose of the article” or if it “affects the cost or quality of the article.” 
(quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 466 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982))). 
 200. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (noting that “laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable subject matter (quoting 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)); ARIAD Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112 bars the patenting 
of basic research). 
 201. See Shiffrin, supra note 67, at 156-57. 
 202. See id.; MERGES, supra note 19, at 58 (“IP rules that systematically encourage 
creators to claim much more than they have in fact produced through their efforts may . . . 
bring about a fair amount of spoilage in the true Lockean sense.”). 
 203. See Van Houweling, supra note 29, at 1575 (discussing the value of the public 
domain to poorly-financed creators). 
 204. See Radin, supra note 28, at 986-87 (describing a continuum on which people 
should have more property protection for non-fungible goods more closely associated with 
their identities); Hughes, supra note 26, at 334, 348 (explaining that Hegel was 
comfortable with alienation of tangible creations, but had great distaste for alienability of  
intellectual property).  
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 One could argue that the utilitarian basis for intellectual property 
protection outweighs the potential harms to labor-desert, personhood, 
and distributive justice concerns that might arise from granting ex-
clusive rights in works near the edge of the public domain.205 But the 
existence of negative spaces demonstrates that even from a utilitari-
an standpoint, intellectual property protection is likely unneces-
sary—and possibly counter-productive—in these and similar areas. 
The fashion industry benefits from the “fashion cycle” of copying-
based trend creation and replacement.206 “Hot news” and databases 
are both significantly more valuable to first movers than to others. 
The first broadcasters and compilers of useful information will, in 
this age of electronic customer mobility, be able to capture a larger 
market share; we do not need exclusivity to promote speedy news and 
useful databases. A 2005 European Commission study indicated that 
the U.S. database industry, which operates in a relative low-IP envi-
ronment, was growing faster than the European Union's, which op-
erates under a sui generis protection system.207 The same is true of 
business methods: a genuinely superior business method will not 
require patent protection to benefit those who create it—and if it is 
not superior, no one will use it.208 Patent protection is thus unneces-
sary to incentivize the creation of superior business methods.  
Rather, patent protection of business methods chiefly serves to in-
crease transaction costs.209
                                                                                                                  
 205. In the database context, Keith Aoki identified these ills as the result of artificially 
(through the mechanism of intellectual property protection) shifting information from “public” 
to “private,” trading the specter of “potential scarcity” from underproduction in the absence of 
incentives for the known ill of “actual scarcity” from private control of otherwise-public 
information. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual 
Property and the Public Domain, Part I, 18 COLUM-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 19-21 (1993). 
 206. See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 1.  
 207. First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases 20, 22-
23 (Dec. 12, 2005) (DG Internal Market and Services Working Paper), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf. 
 208. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1618 (2003) (“As many commentators have noted, however, companies have 
ample incentives to develop business methods even without patent protection, because the 
competitive marketplace rewards companies that use more efficient business methods. 
Even if competitors copy these methods, first mover advantages and branding can provide 
rewards to the innovator. Because new business methods do not generally require 
substantial investment in R&D, the prospect of even a modest supracompetitive reward 
will provide sufficient incentive to innovate.”). 
 209. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting) 
(“Business innovations, by their very nature, provide a competitive advantage and thus 
generate their own incentives.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents 
Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 275 (2000); but
see Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market 
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340 (2008) (arguing that firms need incentives for 
“market experimentation” when first mover or branding advantages prove insufficient).  
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 The analysis concludes, therefore, that we should resist the temp-
tation to shrink the public domain. On the contrary, we should look for 
opportunities to expand it when protection is not necessary to generate 
an incentive to create. Intellectual property law often continues to pro-
vide exclusivity long after that exclusivity acts as an incentive. The law 
should value these harms and permit—or compel—creations to reenter 
the commons to promote further creation when their cultural and 
social value overtakes the incentive value of exclusivity. Otherwise, 
the risks of such overprotection—to the commons, to the personhood 
of consumers, and to distributive justice—are apparent.210
VII. CONCLUSION
 Negative spaces are incubators for intellectual property theory: 
they invite inquiry and provide a medium for theoretical testing. Be-
cause each negative-space microcosm functions without formal intel-
lectual property protection, the ecosystem of negative spaces chal-
lenges us to examine assumptions about the purpose and effective-
ness of intellectual property protection in all contexts. To meet that 
challenge, we must examine intellectual property not only from the 
utilitarian standpoint of incentives and efficiencies, but also from the 
perspective of the other philosophies that animate intellectual prop-
erty law as we know it: labor-desert, personality, and distributive 
justice theories. This Article undertakes such an examination and 
draws conclusions about how low-IP systems arise and survive while 
surrounded by legal, economic, and moral frameworks that demand 
formal legal protection of intellectual creations. 
 Utilitarian, labor-desert, personality, and distributive justice the-
ories all support intellectual property protection, although they pro-
vide different justifications for that protection. But each theory can 
also be distilled to a justification for negative space: (1) as a matter of 
incentives, negative spaces will exist where sharing promotes crea-
tion more than protection would; (2) from a labor-desert perspective, 
negative spaces will arise where exclusivity would result in waste, 
would deprive creators of adequate source material, or would deprive 
creators of their preferred rewards; (3) personality theory predicts 
negative spaces when sharing supports the identity interests of crea-
tors and/or users; and (4) distributive justice theory would expect 
them when creators have a strong interest in disseminating their 
works or where copying creates a net benefit to society at large.  
                                                                                                                  
 210. See Liu, supra note 87, at 408-20 (discussing various personhood-fostering uses, 
such as time/space shifting, community building, self-expression such as mix tapes, fan-art, 
or learning a piece on the guitar). 
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 The result is far from a clear-cut theoretical agreement about 
when to provide formal protections for intellectual creations and 
when to avoid such protections. But we can draw some normative 
guidance from their overlap. The lesson, it appears, is moderation. 
Each theory demands both formal protection and its absence; each 
theory demands a mix of exclusivity and sharing. The trick is balanc-
ing. I propose that focusing on one theory to the exclusion of others 
harms that balance. By observing the fragile ecosystems of negative 
spaces through all theoretical lenses, we not only observe that some-
times-precarious balance, but also provide a tool for maintaining it. 
Taken together, the theories suggest that formal systems should, 
when possible, encourage attribution, and even permit creators to 
elect attribution-based protection in lieu of exclusivity-based  
protection. They also reinforce the importance of a robust public  
domain and suggest that formal mechanisms—not merely forbear-
ance—should exist to permit “productive infringements” that build on 
existing works and inventions without harming their value or mean-
ing. Finally, and most broadly, they counsel skepticism over expand-
ing protection. Formal protection may generate some benefits, but may 
just as easily undermine other theoretical bases for creative liberty.
